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ABSTRACT
Rethinking Community Benefits Agreements
Across the United States, conflicts often erupt when large-scale real estate develop-
ment projects are proposed and executed in low-income neighborhoods of large
cities. Communities increasingly ask for benefits to offset negative impacts caused by
new development. These requests often take the form of negotiated contracts called
Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs). CBAs are the subject of some debate,
especially as regards their effectiveness, legality, and fairness. Community groups,
developers, and city officials all have different views on this topic. In this thesis, the
CBA debate is examined in light of five New York City-based case studies involving
controversial benefits negotiations. While CBAs can lead to greater benefits for some
communities, the ad hoc nature of the agreements and the ways in which they are ne-
gotiated pose serious risks. I offer a new process for managing public benefits negotia-
tions.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence Susskind
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Introduction
Across the United States, conflicts often
erupt when large-scale urban real estate
development projects are proposed.
The stakeholders involved - residents,
municipal officials, and private developers
- all have different and competing
interests. While city governments work
hard to entice private investment through
subsidies and land swaps, low income
residents fear that they will either be forced
out by gentrification or bear an unfair
burden of the impacts of development,
while reaping little of the economic benefit
created. Indeed, it seems as though with
every large-scale development project
there are questions about whether or not
low-income neighborhoods will truly
benefit from new development, or if the
breaks that are being given to developers
are justifiable.
This conflict between low-income
neighborhoods and city government,
as well as low-income neighborhoods
with developers, over the allocation of
development benefits has raised questions
about the most appropriate format for
conducting public benefits negotiations,
and particularly the question of who
represents the interests of low-income
neighborhoods when such deals are
formulated. Municipal land use decisions
are typically the product of a standard legal
process involving public hearings as well as
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other opportunities for community input,
such as formal and informal meetings,
on both the development program (land
use of the site) and its associated benefits.
City staff expect feedback - if not pointed
questioning and outright disagreement -
from community groups, as well as elected
officials, business interests, and other
members of the public and government
involved with the municipal land use
review process. Many community groups,
however, feel that the standard procedure
excludes their interests, and that the
current approach leaves them with either
no place at the negotiating table, too few
benefits, or both.
As a result of this exclusion, over the past
15 years community groups and advocates
in many parts of the United States have
advocated a new approach to public
benefits negotiations commonly called
community benefits agreements (CBAs)1 .
CBAs are a contract between a coalition
of residents or community groups and
developers delineating the steps that both
agree to take to ensure that residents likely
to be negatively affected by a proposed
development will benefit in appropriate
ways. In most places, a signed CBA is
1 For excellent overviews of CBAs, see
"Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions,
Values, and Legal Enforceability" by Julian Gross,
"Community Benefits Agreements: Making Devel-
opment Projects Accountable", a report published
by Good Jobs First and the California Partnership
for Working Families, or University of Albany
Law Professor Amy Levine's excellent blog, www.
communitybenefitsblogspot.com.
assumed to be binding on all parties to
the agreement in the same way that an
agreement between a municipality and
a developer is binding on both sides
(although the legal basis for binding
commitments is not always clear and there
isno enabling legislation that sets precedent
for CBAs). Community groups often
negotiate CBAs directly with developers,
asking for the things they feel are owed
to their communities to offset negative
impacts, apart from what city, county, state
and federal laws and regulations might
require (Gross, LeRoy, Janis-Aparicio,
First, & Families, 2002). Since perceptions
of what a neighborhood or community
needs - including compensation to offset
adverse development impacts - vary from
place to place, the benefits requested by
community groups in different cities can
be quite different.
Benefits agreements - in particular their
impact, role, and legality - are the center
of a growing national debate. Given the
tensions displayed among stakeholders in
the press, literature, and in my research,
my central questions are: do CBAs truly
address issues of fairness, community
representation, fiscal accountability
and feasibility of benefit delivery in the
eyes of all stakeholders? Or are they one
more exaction placed on developers? Are
municipalities simply giving away too
much to developers in hopes of attracting
any new development (and the tax revenue
involved) and, in doing so, ignoring the
needs of neighborhoods that have not seen
significant improvement in decades? How
could a benefits negotiation process be
better managed?
These questions lie at the core of the CBA
debate, and raise further serious questions
about the role of public officials and
municipal planners. As urban development
becomes more private sector oriented
and more project-based, are municipal
economic development planners caught
in an inherent conflict of interest? How
can long term comprehensive planning
that accounts for economic growth, and
the needs of communities impacted by
individual development projects that help
spur growth, be managed simultaneously?
As cities' reliance on private investment
grows or remains, their perceived bias
towards private developers over the needs
of communities encourages community
advocates to directly negotiate with
developers - despite municipal fears that
community involvement and demands
could jeopardize development projects.
The questions raised about the best way
for negotiations to be fair, representative of
the community, fiscally accountable, and
feasible are paramount.
A small body of literature examines
CBAs, especially in relation to the most
contentious urban development projects.
Community organizations advocating
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for CBAs have established a set of report
formats to guide others in the CBA
formation process. Julian Gross' 2005
seminal report, "Community Benefits
Agreements: Making Development
Projects Accountable" was the first written
by a community organization, and is
referenced by many blogs, websites,
articles, and community groups as the best
guide for how to conduct a CBA. In addition
to providing a backdrop for local economic
development, Gross' report chronicles the
story of the Staples Center CBA in Los
Angeles, widely known as the first CBA
in the United States. Similar playbooks
with recommendations for CBAs exist
elsewhere; for example, the University of
Michigan's "Recommendations to a Guide
for a Community Benefits Agreement"
to address benefits and negotiations
around a particular local development
project. A handful of academics, including
Laura Wolf-Powers at the University
of Pennsylvania and Amy Levine at the
University of Albany School of Law, have
published articles on CBAs that examine
their legal and statutory legitimacy. Levine
additionally maintains a regular blog that
chronicles CBA negotiations across the
United States, linking to many articles
in the popular press. In New York City,
the New York Bar Association released a
report questioning whether or not CBAs
are constitutional and whether they are
illegal exactions. The NYC Comptrollers'
Office responded by convening a Task
Force that issued a report recommending
that the City develop set standards to
guide the negotiation of future CBAs in
the city. There are a handful of graduate
student theses that examine CBAs, but the
literature remains underdeveloped given
the seriousness of the debate over if and
how benefits should be provided.
This thesis seeks to contribute to this
small but growing body of literature. I am
particularly interested in understanding
the implications of the debate around
public benefits for the current practice
of urban land use planning. Due to
changes in federal funding for urban
development projects, many municipal
governments focus primarily on attracting
private investment to spur economic
growth, leaving existing low-income
neighborhoods feeling neglected or that
the city has sold them out to private
investment. In some instances, the intense
fights over development projects have
caused developers to walk away.
While the existing literature provides
a strong foundation for understanding
the key issues involved with CBAs, it
does not offer concrete ideas about how
to resolve the current tension between
neighborhoods and municipalities over
how public benefits are defined and
allocated. I propose a better model that
promotes more sustainable and fairer
negotiations for all stakeholders involved.
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Any new model must take account of the
context in which the current debate is
taking place. Thus, the first chapter of this
thesis seeks to understand the history of
local economic development and municipal
dependence on the private investment.
Chapter two explores the legal history
of benefits agreements from formalized
exactions to the rise of ad hoc CBAs today.
Taken together, these chapters set the
context in which the current debate must
be understood. Chapter three presents the
challenges and opportunities of benefits
negotiations in New York City and reports
on five case studies of past and current
projects involving benefits negotiations
in that city. Chapter four draws lessons
from New York City's experience and
presents major findings across the cases.
Chapter five proposes a better framework
for benefits negotiations; it imagines an
institutionalized system of representative,
fiscally accountable, and feasible benefits
determinations and negotiations that
could be implemented relatively easily in
most major American cities. Providing
primary research via the case studies and a
proposal for a new model is important, as
this thesis helps fill a gap in the literature
by chronicling several of the cases for the
first time, and to address key questions
surrounding CBAs.
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I. A Brief History of Local
Economic Development as it
Relates to CBAs
The debate and controversy around public
benefits associated with development in
low-income communities is not new, but
rather, has evolved over time in response
to how development and its review process
is conducted and how public benefits have
been provided to low-income communities.
The benefits negotiation process itself
has become increasingly controversial
in recent years, and involves a range
of stakeholders including community
groups, advocates, elected officials,
municipalities, and developers. Before
delving into the specifics of Community
Benefits Agreements (CBAs), we need to
ask why community groups believe so
fervently that direct negotiations between
residents and developers are necessary to
supplement traditional forms of taxation
and administrative oversight by elected
and appointed officials. Public hearings
and related forms of public review
and comment precede most municipal
decisions about development. Why are
these no longer sufficient (if they ever
were) to ensure that neighborhoods get
their "fair share" of development benefits
and are compensated for whatever
disproportionate costs they bear on behalf
of the rest of the city? In fact, in some
municipalities, developers are urged or
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required to make direct (linkage) payments
to the city or to set aside affordable housing
units without any requirement that a CBA
be negotiated directly with residents.' Why
is this not enough, and if it is enough, why
aren't linkage programs more prevalent?
Why do some community groups strive
for CBAs?
The answers are complex, and deeply
rooted in the history of local urban
economic development and urban
poverty in the United States. Historically,
disadvantaged communities have had
few means available to them to ensure
that they benefit from new development,
and poor communities have been at high
risk of displacement by new real estate
investment (Bornstein, 2007). Unless there
is an election pending, low-income urban
communities lack the political leverage
required to ensure that they get a "fair
share" of the tax revenue or jobs created by
new development (Grogan, 200). This next
section provides an overview of municipal
strategies for development, with a focus
on how funding patterns impact those
strategies.
1 For further reading on linkage programs,
see HUD's report "Making Connections: A Study
of Employment Linkage Programs" by Frieda
Molina and "Survey of Linkage Programs in Other
US Cities with Comparisons to Boston" prepared
by the Boston Redevelopment Authority.
Flight to the Suburbs
Development policies and funding
decisions since the 1960s are particularly
important to understand the public
benefits debate today. Following urban
renewal efforts in the 1960s, federal funds
to directly support urban improvements
managed by municipalities declined
significantly (Wolf-Powers, 2005). This
is due in large part to the significant
plunge in inner city population from the
1970s-1980s.2 Flight from cities was led
by the middle class who sought to avoid
the crumbling infrastructure of older
cities, instead embracing the lower-cost
amenities of the suburbs that catered
to "a middle-class consumer taste for
detaches houses, larger lots, and (at least
among whites) homogeneous racial and
ethnic environments" (Grogan, 2000). Jobs
and businesses also fled to the suburbs,
following a desirable workforce and
similar amenities of cheaper land and
newer infrastructure. Poorer households
and residents remained in cities, resulting
in a significant concentration of poverty
in cities (Grogan, 2000). Grogan notes that
"this leaves the largely minority poor not
only stranded in crumbling inner cities,
but more and more isolated from the
employment that might help them
2 In his book on Urban Revitalization, Paul
Grogan writes "the same death rattle seemed to
be sounding at once from central cities all over the
country. More than half the nation's 100 largest
cities shrank in the 1980s: Gary, Indiana lost nearly
one quarter of its population, Philadelphia lost
100,000 people, Detroit lost 175,000, and Chicago
nearly a quarter of a million" (Grogan 2000).
rebuild or move." This dramatic shift of
population and business concentration led
to the declining impact of cities on federal
policies and funding decisions (Grogan,
2000) as federal dollars tend to follow
business interests.
Changes in Federal Funding Patterns
Many cities experienced recession in
the 1970s, forcing them to eliminate
programming. The recession was
compounded by the federal government's
slow withdrawal of funding for physical
urban redevelopment (Wolf-Powers,
2005). Fainstein explains that "major
development efforts faltered as cities were
thrown entirely on their own resources for
putting together a project" (Fainstein, 2009)
following the decline in federal funding.
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration
aimed to cut additional federal funds for
domestic agendas, instead encouraging
private sector property development and
urban investment (Wolf-Powers, 2005).
With few resources to invest in urban areas
and a lack of federal support for enhancing
neighborhood leadership (following the
elimination of the Model Cities Program3),
3 The Model Cities Program, in existence
from 1966-1974, "created a new program at the
Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) intended to improve coordination of
existing urban programs and provide additional
funds for local plans. The program's goals empha-
sized comprehensive planning, involving not just
rebuilding but also rehabilitation, social service
delivery, and citizen participation" (http://www.
encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/83 2.html).
It operated in select cities, and is thought to have
ended before it made significant impact on the
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municipalities were left with few federally
supported options to sustain and promote
urban redevelopment, physical or
economic, in low-income neighborhoods4.
A Shift to Private Funding
Because of the withdrawal of federal
funding, private sector investment became
an increasingly important municipal
redevelopment strategy. In more recent
years, municipalities have employed
competitive strategies to attract businesses
and private investment into cities that
ideally bring jobs, modem technology, and
an increased tax base. Cities face a number
of challenges when competing for private
investment as compared to suburban or
rural areas. With comparably less to offer
than the suburbs in terms of open space,
developable land, and other amenities, city
governments tend to use the resources they
have to attract and negotiate with private
sector businesses, including access to
community level.
4 In response, cities have pursued a range
of economic development strategies to promote
growth and redevelopment. Local community
based organizations, called Community Develop-
ment Corporations (CDCs), focus on specific local
development projects ranging from affordable
housing to retail and commercial development
(Grogan 2000). Many cities support these commu-
nity-led development efforts through partnership
efforts or policy and funding support through
CDBG. While the CDC movement is an important
factor for urban redevelopment and increased
economic activity, the projects led by CDCs do not
tend to be as controversial in development plans,
scale, funding, or community representation, and
as such will not be the focus of discussion in this
thesis.
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public funds such as public subsidies, tax
abatements, fee waivers, complementary
direct investment (Bornstein, 2007), low-
interest loans and other regulatory relief
(Fainstein, 2009), zoning concession, loans,
the use of eminent domain (Altshuler,
2003), as well as access to parcels of land
made available through land assembly
and swaps (Fainstein, 2009). Municipalities
use these incentives "to entice private
developers to make large front-end
investments in property acquisition as well
as construction" (Fainstein, 2009). Indeed,
many municipalities have embraced
privately funded large-scale development
projects5 as a strategy for commercial
development and city-building, ranging
from office parks to hotels, from stadiums
to retail centers (Altshuler, 2003; Bornstein,
2007). When aimed at a specific location,
these projects drive investment and bring
resources to redevelop a neighborhood
while promoting commercial and
economic development. Cities stood to
gain from renewed development activity
and the benefits that brings such as tax
revenue and revitalization, and private
developers stood to gain increased
revenues (Bornstein, 2007).
5 The literature broadly defines mega-proj-
ects or large-scale projects, and includes a wide
range of development: stadiums, hotels, office
parks, mixed-use developments, housing complex-
es. In the sources cited in this section, there are no
references to the size (square footage), project cost,
or subsidies that could help define what makes a
project a "mega-project" or "large-scale project."
Public-Private Partnerships
By the 1980s and throughout the 1990s,
business attraction strategies evolved into
more formal public-private partnerships
between municipalities and private sector
businesses, and became the primary
means of spurring investment in cities.
In many U.S. cities, these public-private
partnerships had led to commercial and
mixed-use mega-projects, where public
subsidies and other regulatory relief entice
private investment (Fainstein, 2009; Gross,
et al., 2002; Krumholtz, 1999). Bornstein
points out that the "cost and complexity of
large-scale projects, as well as prevailing
political attitudes.. .have meant that many
new 'public' facilities have been pursued
in partnership with the private sector."
By the late 1990s governments at all levels
were spending upwards of $50 billion
annually on public-private partnership
programs, demonstrating an increasing
reliance on those relationships to spur
economic development (Gross, et al.,
2002). Large-scale projects became a
primary development tool of cities, despite
evidence that says they do not generate
overall public benefits and that the
benefits created do not trickle down to all
residents. Additionally, these projects are
increasingly financed with public money
(Bornstein, 2007; Gross, et al., 2002). For
example, the recent New York Yankee
Stadium constructed in the Bronx was a
$1.5 billion project - financed in part by
$300 million in public city subsidies, $942
million in tax-exempt bonds issued by the
local Industrial Development Authority,
and an additional $259 million in tax-
exempt bonds issued later on, totally $1.5
billion of investment. The new stadium
was constructed, in part, on former
parkland assembled by the City and given
to the Yankees for development. Without
such deep support from the public sector,
the Yankees were threatening to leave the
Bronx. Local elected officials and the City
claim that the new stadium is a huge boon
for the Bronx, as it brings hundreds of new
jobs and will generate millions of tourism
dollars, while the Yankees were able to build
a project on public land with municipal
support. Yet, neighborhood interests
around benefits - for better jobs, access
to and replacement of valuable parkland
and recreational sites, and involvement in
the neighborhood development process -
were ignored. Similar large-scale projects
have gone up around the country in cities
seeking a catalytic real estate project to
provoke investment and growth, and often
without consideration of neighborhood
interests or recognition that the benefits
from large-scale projects do not trickle
down to benefit all residents. This inequity
angers community groups advocating for
local interests.
Large scale, private-public real estate
initiatives often involve dedicating
enormous resources to a single project,
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which raises questions about the purpose,
use, and accountability of public subsidies.
Given the predominance of projects fueled
by private investment, municipal economic
development has evolved into a state of
dependenceonpublic-privatepartnerships.
Sizable portions of municipal budgets
including grants and tax levy dollars
are dedicated to these larger projects,
leveraging subsidies to court private
investment. This often results in complex
land packages, financing schemes, and tax
incentives that raises questions of legality
and accountability as to how public money
is being spent (Krumholtz, 1999). Does the
public benefit, or the private developer?
In exchange for public subsidies,
developers and businesses typically
promise public benefits of various kinds
to a community or the city as a whole.
Some community groups question the
realization of these benefits. For example,
in NYC, the Industrial Development
Authority provides subsidies to businesses
for relocation and expansion; in return,
businesses promise to guarantee a number
of new jobs, improve street and building
conditions, or contribute to other public
amenities (NYCEDC, 2011). Over time,
critics and watchdogs fear the relationship
between private developers and public
officials involved in these partnerships
has become murky, and accusations
of backroom deals have become more
pronounced. Exactly what are public
subsidies generating, and what is being
provided (to whom) in return? For cities
desperate to spur private investment after
lengthy periods of stagnation or decline
in some neighborhoods, an expanding
tax base and firm growth seems desirable.
Deciding, however, what to offer a specific
developer and what to request in exchange
requires more than just a straightforward
cost-benefit analysis. NYC, for example,
faces corporations laying off thousands
of workers after promising to generate
new jobs, raising questions regarding
the time period over which short-term
public subsidies do or do not contributes
to the city's welfare, or the well-being of
particular communities or segments of the
population over the long haul.
Place-based development strategies,
like large-scale project development,
have not been restricted to traditional
downtown commercial districts, which
complicates the public benefits debate.
As public-private partnerships grew in
prominence in the 1990s, inner cities were
benefitting from the movement of young
professionals back to urban areas from the
suburbs after a period of avoidance and
white flight. These newcomers settled at
the edges of lower income communities
bordering on well-defined neighborhoods.
"Urban regimes, anxious to maintain their
image.. .seeing only limited development
opportunities in old central business
districts, attempted to direct growth to
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parts of their cities that had previously
been viewed as marginal. Thus, the focus
of regeneration moved to areas outside
the old urban core" (Fainstein, 2009). This
gentrification coincided with developers
shifting their focus to formerly neglected
and underdeveloped neighborhoods; cities
welcomed these new urban investments.
Developers sought, and continue to seek,
development opportunities in areas where
land prices are low. Leveraging city-
owned land, cities are prepared to give
investors a helping hand by providing
access to available, underdeveloped land
and neighborhoods (Wolf-Powers, 2005).
Development Impact on Low-income
Communities
While new development in underinvested
areas beyond central districts is touted as
a driver of economic development, the
positive benefits of development do not
necessarily 'trickle down' to all residents.
The allure of new jobs, retail outlets,
enhancement of certain city services, and
an increased tax base are all attractive,
but large-scale projects do not necessarily
benefit those in greatest need (Gross,
et al., 2002). In fact, projects like luxury
hotels and malls are unaffordable for low-
income consumers, and provide low-wage
jobs. The jobs created by the new Yankee
Stadium are estimated to pay an "average
starting wage for non-managerial workers
[of] $9.19 an hour, and that median wages
for stadium workers are $10.50 an hour"
(Fiscal Policty Institute, 2010). Indeed,
promises of a rising tide of economic
prosperity as a result of a large-scale project
like Yankee Stadium did not ring true; the
wage rates paid for stadium workers are
too low to make a real different to low-
income residents. In her study of several
mega-project developments and their
associated benefits agreements, Bornstein
found that "the benefits [are] presumed
rather than carefully analyzed or subjected
to public deliberation" (Bornstein, 2007).
The negative impacts of new developments
on low-income neighborhoods are well
documented. Disamenities include
but are not limited to displacement of
individuals and businesses to provide
space for new construction, increased air
and noise pollution and traffic, changes
to non-residential uses (Bornstein, 2007).
Despite large private investments into
neighborhoods that may have little
economic activity, left alone, large scale
real estate projects do not necessarily
spur economic development, create new
jobs for unemployed urban residents, or
generate the net increases promised to
fund other city service issues (Gross, et
al., 2002). Given the infusion of millions
of public dollars into new development
projects, poor neighborhoods and their
advocates are increasingly asking why
new investment cannot benefit those most
in need.
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Particularly in neighborhoods with high
levels of historical disinvestment, the call for
more responsible, equitable development
grows louder. These neighborhoods are
using what leverage they have in the
development approval process to advocate
for targeted benefits including job training,
educational opportunities, access to
new jobs, a guarantee of living wages,
environmental improvements, creation of
more community parks and open space,
building of and access to grocery stores, day
care and senior citizen centers, dedicated
community meeting space, improved
transportation connectivity, preference
for local retailers, and the like (Gross, et
al., 2002; Wolf-Powers, 2010). Developers
and municipalities often disagree with
what impacted neighborhoods feel would
be a reasonable share of the benefits of
new development and, as a result, many
development projects have become
extremely contentious. Developers,
municipalities, and the advocates of low-
income neighborhoods jockey to distribute
the benefits of new development.
The Role of Planners
Municipalities continue to employ
property-based development strategies
to attract private investment, and the
debate over public benefits continues to
this day. This practice of "property-led
development," as opposed to more holistic,
long-term neighborhood planning, elicits
very different reactions among professional
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planners. Indeed, the people vs. place
debate is central to urban redevelopment
strategy.6 Supporters of property-led
development make a pragmatic argument:
their goal is to support struggling cities
and neighborhoods in the short term in
any way they can, mostly through large-
scale physical commercial developments.
They describe "land use planners and
development officials as local heroes,
navigating among disparate interest
groups to make possible the land deals that
result in revenue-generating and amenity-
creating development" (Wolf-Powers,
2005).
On the other hand, critics of this pragmatic
viewofplanningbelievethat"urbanofficials
with the power to regulate development
and land use have been enlisted to
produce a socio-spatial structure that
supports the aims of property capitalists"
(Wolf-Powers, 2005) without regard
to the negative impacts of speculation,
displacement, and gentrification on
poor and middle-class residents. Wolf-
Powers suggests that planners involved
in property-led development are stuck in
a structural dilemma, since this approach
to urban development does not allow for
comprehensive planning. Moreover, it
continues to drive real estate development,
making traditional comprehensive
planning less likely. Either way, critics of
6 For an overview of the literature sur-
rounding this debate, see Karl Seidman's Inner
City Commercial Revitalization Literature Review.
the current process ask "whether, despite
planners' public-minded intentions, the
essence of the profession is betrayed when
the ideal of comprehensive planning is
supplanted by a 'project-based' model
that closely tracks practice in the for-profit
sector" (Wolf-Powers, 2005). Critics of
place-based planning argue that the needs
of residents are ignored, perpetuating
further cycles of poverty (Seidman). This
raises serious questions as to the role of
urban planners in development projects
and associated benefits, and may lead
poor communities and their advocates
to wonder if they can trust city planners
to have communities' interests as a top
priority.
Brief History of Local Economic Development 17
II. Legal Framework and
Types of Benefits Programs
Benefits negotiations around commercial
real estate and economic development
projects have been debated and addressed
across the country as questions of
equitable development have come to the
forefront. The types of debates, programs,
and agreements have varied and changed
over the past few decades, ranging
from municipal-driven institutionalized
exactions to community-driven ad
hoc Community Benefits Agreements
(CBAs) and political negotiations today.
This chapter reviews the most relevant
discussions, programs, and decisions
around benefits negotiations and the roots
of community advocacy for these benefits.
It gives an overview of the legal structure
around benefits, contrasts institutionalized
exaction programs with CBAs, and focuses
the current debate on CBAs. Furthermore,
it aims to provide a historical framework
and platform of past benefits negotiations
against which a new model and current
initiatives can be evaluated.
Exactions
Throughout time, municipalities have
required landowners or developers to
give something back to the city when
those landowners wish to make a change
to their land. This aspect of takings law,
called exactions, "encompasses a variety
of concessions that municipalities extract
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from landowners who wish to change the
use of their land, such as impact fees, the
provision of services, restrictions on land
use, and dedications of land" (Kendall,
1995). Exactions strive to mitigate negative
impacts that development imposes upon
a community. In an examination of
exactions as a municipal tool for receiving
benefits, Kendall and Ryan note that
exactions are a "relatively inexpensive
way to regulate and obtain land" (Kendall,
1995), especially since it generally does
not require compensation. Exactions have
been a valuable tool for local governments.
The practice of taking exactions from
landowners has been contested up to the
Supreme Court level. Two important cases
have set precedent for benefits negotiations
around development and limitations for
the use of exactions. In Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission (Nollan), the decision
sets a precedent that "requires that there be
an'essential nexus' between the purpose of
that exaction and the purpose that would
be served by prohibiting the proposed
development" (Kendall, 1995). This means
that the benefit exacted must address
an impact directly caused by the new
development. For example, construction
of new dwelling units will likely increase
the number of children attending local
schools, so there is a nexus between the
addition of new housing and increasing
public school capacity. An increase in
dwelling units does not necessarily impact
noxious uses of surrounding development
sites, so an exaction for a community
health center would not be considered a
nexus. A second Supreme Court decision,
Dolan v. City of Tigard (Dolan), sets a
precedent that "further requires that the
exaction imposed be roughly proportional
to the projects impact of the proposed
development" (Kendall, 1995). Thus, if five
new dwelling units were built, it would be
disproportionate to require a developer
to build an addition to a school. Taken
together, Nollan and Dolan provide the
legal foundation of benefits negotiations
that still exist today when considering
exactions upon developers.
Institutionalized Approach: Linkage
Programs
Some cities have pursued linkage programs
as another attempt to address benefits,
codifying the desire of some municipal
governments to pursue complementary
or alternative strategies to development
and systematized benefits redistribution.
Linkage programs are a form of
institutionalized exaction that requires
a developer to provide pre-determined
benefits in order to obtain various real
estate development approvals. Such
programs are standard practice in several
US cities including Boston MA, Cambridge
MA, Berkeley CA, and Portland OR. Cities
with linkage programs tend to be strong
market cities, giving those municipalities
leeway to exact fees from developers while
still maintaining a competitive real estate
environment.
Different cities exact different benefits
or fees from developers depending on
program design. Boston's linkage program
uses development controls as a leverage
point, and "requires that developers of
large-scale commercial, retail, hotel, or
institutional structures seeking zoning
relief pay anexactionto construct affordable
housing off-site" (Avault, 2000). Fees
can be paid to a Neighborhood Housing
Trust over a period of 7-12 years, allowing
developers an opportunity to pay the
exaction from operating funds generated
by new construction, though many pay
the fee at the start of construction (Avault,
2000). Employment linkage programs
are an approach to connecting urban job
seekers to employment opportunities
created by new development in a program
managed in part by local government.
Employment linkage and workforce
programs use "the lever of development
incentives (loans, tax abatements, zoning
variances, land assembly, etc.) to capture
job opportunities created for unemployed
residents... [giving] targeted communities
priority information and access to the
job opportunities created as the result of
public incentives" (Molina, 1998). These
first-source hiring programs require
development tenants to give certain
communities priority access to both
information and hiring opportunities in
Current Legal Framework 19
exchange for development incentives
provided by local government. Cities use
exactions to fund programming as they see
fit.
Linkage programs have growing support
as a meaningful exaction that addresses
community needs in a controlled and
lasting way. A 1998 report by the Center for
Community Change states that if the local
government embeds community benefits
into its policies and programs, they have
staying power, greater legitimacy, and
increased support as compared to ad hoc
benefits requests. For example, in both
Portland, OR and Berkeley, CA, local
governments have included workforce
development policies into their broader
economic development agendas. This
centralized institutionalization helps
ensure that the benefits will be delivered,
and that they will not change with shifting
political administrations (Molina, 1998).
Program longevity can be supported by
commitment and leadership at several
levels - local government, program staff,
and public officials, all who might believe
in the importance between connecting
economic development and poverty
alleviation. Additionally, Molina notes that
"community support must be broad and
committed enough to enable the program
to survive municipal administrations and
volatile economic conditions," further
ensuring longevity (Molina, 1998).
The origins of linkage programs share
similar roots with the advocacy agendas
that comprise the CBA movement today.
Boston's linkage program grew from
large-scale community involvement and
a champion in a City Councilor turned
Mayor, and prides itself on its core belief
that"growth canbe facilitatedby expanding
participatory and redistributive public
policies and that within the structural
limits that constrain urban policymaking"
(Dreier, 1991). The program likely would
not have had traction without the myriad
community groups, neighborhood
associations, and progressive advocacy
organizations that formed a coalition
to fight for it (Dreier, 1991), as well as
the political and municipal support to
enact it. An examination of the Boston
Linkage program published by the Duke
University School of Law found that the
program meets the criteria of both Nollan
and Dolan, and therefore can be mandated
as an exaction (Kayden, 1987).
Despite the success of existing linkage
programs, surprisingly few cities in the US
maintain such programs. This may be due
to fear of negative perceptions on economic
growth or creating a hostile development
environment, existing markets for housing
creation or job training, or simply a lack of
political will directed toward redistributive
benefits (Avault, 2000). It is also likely a
function of strong vs. weak market cities;
municipal governments operating in weak
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markets do not have the leverage to impose
exactions of any type on developers, while
those in strong market cities may do so more
readily. Other critics argue that "linkage
is no more than a cynically veiled effort to
tax one segment of society to another while
the getting is good" (Kayden, 1987).
In cities without linkage programs, the
process of benefit redistribution can
be entirely undefined. Cities may be
hands-on negotiators and facilitators of
discussions among community advocates
and developers, or alternately can be
removed from the process or even dissuade
developers and community groups from
interacting for fear a private investment
deal will fall through. In these cities,
CBA agreements may act as a stand-in to
determine redistributive policies when the
government does not take action, or can
be a tool for government and community
groups to command benefits from
developers.
Ad Hoc Approach: Community Benefits
Agreements
Given the small number of cities with
linkage programs and the great number
of development projects around which
public benefits controversies arise,
many communities around the country
are using the latest tool to negotiate for
benefits: community benefits agreements
(CBAs). By the most common definition,
CBAs are contracts between coalitions
of community groups and developers
delineating the steps that both agree to
take to ensure that residents likely to be
affected by new development will benefit
in appropriate and positive ways (Gross, et
al., 2002). Community groups sometimes
negotiate CBAs directly with developers',
asking for the benefits they feel are owed
to their community, apart from what
cities, counties, state and federal laws
and regulations might require. Since
perceptions of what a neighborhood or a
community needs, and what it might feel
it is entitled to by way of compensation
to offset development impacts, vary from
place to place, the benefits requested by
community organizations - even in the
same city - can be quite different. In most
places, the presumption is that signed
CBAs are binding on both the developer
and the community, although the legal
basis for binding commitments is not
always clear2; some contracts are explicit,
while others employ vague language that
leaves uncertainty as to what commitments
are binding for whom. Some community
benefit agreements also include explicit
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms
(Gross, et al., 2002). In many instances,
1 A 2010 report by the NYC Comptrollers'
Office, "Recommendations of the Task Force on
Public Benefits Agreements," notes the existence of
27 CBAs to date.
2 For further discussion of the legal ques-
tions surrounding CBAs, see "Community Benefits
Agreements: Opportunities and Traps for Devel-
opers, Municipalities, and Community Organiza-
tions" by Patricia Salkin which provides analysis
on CBA's legal challenges.
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CBAs are ad hoc agreements created
outside of regulated government policy.
In some parts of the country, local economic
development offices are trying to use CBAs
to target private investments in low-income,
marginalized communities 3 , while in other
places such as NYC, local governments
strive to avoid CBAs altogether.
Advocates of CBAs, including a range
of community activists and associations,
local government officials, and some
developers, believe that CBAs provide an
effective means of redistributing at least
a portion of the benefits that
private developers realize when Goal
they do "the public's business." Inclusiven
In contrast to the standard
situation in which developers Enforceabi
negotiate solely with regulatory
agencies and city officials for
permission to build, CBAs Coalition-
require developers (if they are
willing to come to the table) to Efficiency
pursue parallel conversations
with the residents most likely Clarity of
to be adversely affected by
whatever is being proposed,
supporting the belief that greater social
justice may be achieved when CBAs are
negotiated properly (Gross et al). Critics of
CBAs, on the other hand, note that CBAs
are unregulated negotiations between
3 The Staples Center CBA in Los Angeles
included full support of municipal and elected of-
ficials, as did Minneapolis officials who partnered
with community groups to create a CBA for digital
inclusion of wireless technology for communities
without Internet access.
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wide varieties of possible stakeholders.
There are no guarantees that CBAs will be
negotiated properly, or that community
groups can achieve their social justice goals
(Been, 2010).
The benefits of CBAs, for the community,
developers and cities, are well documented
by academics, lawyers, and community
advocates alike. In the 2002 report
"Community Benefits Agreements:
Making Development Projects
Accountable," benefits are described from
Outcome
ess Representation of affected
community
lity Ability to hold developers
to commitments
ricy Monitoring and reporting
on project outcomes
uilding Strengthening alliances
among community groups
Avoid project delay through
earlier negotiations
outcomes Ability to demonstrate ben-
efit delivery
the community's perspective and are
analyzed using the following criteria:
In her detailed analysis on CBAs, land use
lawyer and real estate professor Vicki Been
notes that community groups also argue
that CBAs allow them to fully participate
in a process that addresses elements of
development projects that are typically
excluded from standard land-use planning
processes, particularly since in some cities
like New York City, the standard land-
use review process gives the community
an advisory role only. CBAs also benefit
communities by allowing a forum to
address issues excluded from land use
processes, such as wage levels or local
hiring, which relate to development and
growth but are not typically managed by
municipalities. CBAs bestow benefits
upon developers too. Community groups
agree to support the project, increasing the
chances that project will gain necessary
city approvals, and decreasing the
likelihood that community groups will
fight the development in court. Been also
details benefits for local officials, including
an ability to bypass the legal constraints
of Nolan and Dollan to achieve greater
exactions. To a certain extent, CBAs let city
officials off the hook, as they can distance
themselves from extreme community
demands in order to maintain good
relations with developers (Been, 2010).
Advocates of CBAs note that for a CBA
agreement to succeed, special attention
must be paid to three points:
* The perceived legitimacy of community
representatives who sit at the
negotiating table with the developer
* The ability of the community coalition
and the developer to hold each other to
their commitments
* Effective implementation of the
agreements reached.
Achieving these points has many
challenges. Salkin highlights the
importance of a strong coalition, noting
that a developer could attempt to divide
a coalition by meeting the needs and
interests of one group and excluding
others, and further notes that a coalition
formed to manage CBA negotiations may
experience challenges when asked to
manage implementation and monitoring
(Salkin, 2007). Been contends that there
is no way of knowing which community
representatives negotiating are truly
representative of community interests
as they are not elected or appointed to
do so, which leads to an inability to hold
representatives accountable for negotiation
outcomes (Been, 2010). "Making
Development Accountable" details
additional challenges, such as differences
in opinions over benefits provisions
(developers and communities wanting
differentthings), legal expenses (employing
an attorney to create a legally enforceable
document), and coalition politics (internal
challenges among community groups)
(Gross, et al., 2002). Been further argues
that because CBAs negotiations are
conducted outside of legal requirements
and procedures, CBAs may be entered into
privately and may in fact exclude affected
community groups (Been, 2010). The role
of municipalities also differs depending on
the strength of that city's market position,
and its relative ability to ask for benefits.
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The ad hoc nature of CBAs may also create
development insecurity, as criteria are
determined on a case-by-case basis. These
challenges can all impact the success of
CBAs.
The debate over CBAs - whether they are
legal, provide adequate representation, or
help achieve holistic development - will
continue as long as communities seek
CBAs in cities that lack institutionalized
exaction policies. The literature examining
institutionalized redistributive exactions
such as linkage is extensive, while that
focusing on CBAs is nascent and tends
to take either a strictly community
advocacy or highly legal approach. In
order to better understand the challenges
and opportunities of CBAs and their ad
hoc nature, it is imperative to examine a
variety of projects and their associated
agreements to consider if the CBA is the
best model for managing benefits in cities
without exaction policies. Furthermore,
careful analysis of such projects can inform
the role that planners may take in future
development projects when balancing the
role of private development with the needs
of community groups.
Land Use Planning in NYC: a Brief
Overview
The next chapter provides a detailed case
analysis of five development projects in
NYC that have CBAs or other benefits
negotiations associated with them in order
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to draw lessons applicable to the general
CBA debate. Before diving into the cases,
it is important to understand the land
use planning process in NYC to which
community groups react with demands
for CBAs. To put the cases that follow
in context, this section provides a brief
overview of NYC's land use planning
process, with perspectives from the NYC
Economic Development Corporation,
the city's quasi-public redevelopment
authority.
Uniform Land Use Review Procedure
(ULURP): Background and Critique
In most municipalities, the land use
approvals process is highly regulated
with a prescribed procedure regarding
development. In NYC, the process is
known as the Uniform Land Use Review
Procedure (ULURP). ULURP was
created to establish organized community
participation in the land use review
process in the 1960s-70s, and granted local
community boards4 an advisory voice in
the review process. Several development
actions are accountable to the ULURP
process, including, but not limited to,
disposition of city-owned property, urban
renewal processes, site selection for capital
4 The NYC Department of City Planning's
website notes: "The city is now divided into 59
community districts, each represented by a Com-
munity Board with up to 50 members who live
or work within the district. Board members, who
serve without pay, are appointed by the Borough
President, half on the recommendation of local
City Council members" http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml
projects, and zoning district amendments
(Planning, 2011).
If ULURP is required, the entity or
developer seeking a land use change files
an application with the Department of City
Planning (DCP) who grants an approval.
Within 60 days of this approval, the
Community Board holds a public hearing
and recommends action on the project.
Next, the Borough President- reviews and
produces a written recommendation about
the project within 30 days of receiving the
Community Board's recommendation;
both of these recommendations are
advisory to DCP and the City Council and
not binding. Within 60 days of receiving
the Borough President's recommendation,
the City Planning Commission (CPC)
holds a public hearing and reviews the
proposed project. If the CPC votes against
the project, ULURP is terminated and
the project cannot move forward; if CPC
approves the project, it may move to the
City Council for review. The City Council
does not automatically review all projects
going through ULURP, though due to the
political nature of development projects
in NYC, it reviews many of them. Before
the City Council vote, there is a 50-day
5 The role of Borough President includes
responsibilities for land use, direct control over a
portion of municipal capital and expense budgets,
improving quality of life, and representing his/
her borough to the city agencies. See the websites
of any current NYC Borough Presidents for a
detailed overview of their respective activities and
active projects.
review period, including a public hearing.
Then the City Council votes by majority to
either reject, approve with modifications,
or approve the project. The City Council's
decision is final. Some projects proceed to
Mayoral approval. If the Mayor chooses
to veto a Council vote, the Council can
override the Mayor's opinion with a 2/3
vote (Planning, 2011).
ULURP provides two primary avenues
for community input and involvement
during which advocates and opponents
may express their beliefs: input during
the public hearings held at each stage of
the process and advocacy of elected City
Council members. In addition, city entities
are taking additional steps to gain public
input. Tom McKnight, SeniorVice President
of Development at the NYCEDC, notes
"there is increasingly a larger effort spent
on getting, engaging with stakeholders
earlier and often.. .every project involves
an outreach process where you're trying to
take the temperature of stakeholders and
get feedback" (McKnight, 2010). He further
explains that the NYCEDC has an open
door policy, and that "if someone has an
issue, we talk about it. If there is a way to
adapt that project to respond to the concern
and make it better, great, and if there's not,
there's not" (McKnight, 2010). He stresses
the importance of including community
advocates early in the process. McKnight
also indicated that the Mayor's Office
increasingly engages communities with
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regard to their concerns over development
in later stages of the process. Where the
NYCEDC focuses on outreach prior to
ULURP and related more specifically to
land use, City Hall conducts outreach on
a wider range of issues. City-led outreach
complements the areas of public inclusion
in ULURP (McKnight, 2010).
Regardless of these opportunities for
involvement, community groups still
strive for CBAs because they feel that their
elected officials do not represent their
interests, or that the opportunities for
involvement in ULURP are insufficient.
Individuals working at NYCEDC have
a variety of opinions as to why this is.
McKnight points out that "the official
ULURP process was created for inclusion,
and I think that a Community Board
should be representative of - it should be
the resource and voice of the community"
(McKnight, 2010) but also understands that
a Community Board representative may
not be representative of the demographic
of its district, which may contribute to
community backlash. Joshua Winter,
Director of the Center for Economic
Transformation in the Strategic Planning
Department at the NYCEDC, believes that
community groups advocate for CBAs
outside of the ULURP process because
of self-interest and a desire to benefit
financially from CBAs (Winter, 2010). By
contrast, John Choe, Director of Policy and
Research at the NYC Comptroller's Office,
points out that community feedback
solicited during the ULURP process
occurs much too late to change anything
fundamental in a project short of the
developer withdrawing their application
and incurring delays and other costs. This
contributes to community groups striving
for CBAs, as the early outreach described
by McKnight may not be enough (Choe,
2010).
While the process described is specific
to NYC, it is reasonable to believe that
other municipalities have clear land use
regulations and procedures that could
be similarly analyzed to understand the
points at which community groups can or
cannot get involved. This would provide
an important framework for analyzing
CBAs in other municipalities.
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III. New York City Case Studies
In New York City (NYC), public benefits
agreements and negotiations, sometimes
manifested as CBAs, have become a fairly
common method for community advocacy
groups to gain some development benefits
for the most underinvested communities
and, simultaneously, for elected officials to
negotiate with developers. NYC provides
an interesting and timely context through
which to examine and evaluate the current
state of CBAs, and to evaluate the impact
of CBAs as a tool for urban redevelopment
and planning practice. It is the only city
outside of Los Angeles (home of the
first CBA) with multiple CBAs in effect.
Each NYC benefits agreement has been
structured differently, so there are several
models to examine. One of the reasons
CBAs in NYC have taken different forms is
that Mayor Bloomberg (2001-present)(C. o.
N. York, 2011) has shifted significantly from
initially supporting CBAs to now strongly
opposing them, thereby dramatically
changing the role of local government.
NYC is currently embroiled in debate and
struggle over CBAs; the New York State Bar
Association has come out opposing CBAs
in their current state (NYBA, 2010), while
some of the most prominent community
groups continue to fight for them. The
NYC Comptroller's Office formed a
committee to review CBAs in NYC, and
in 2010 recommended comprehensive
changes to city policy (Comptroller, 2010).
Additional hands-on research on this topic-
particularly at a juncture when the City is
open to policy and program suggestions
- could significantly change government
approach to public benefits agreements
and negotiation processes. The majority
of research and publication on CBAs has
been conducted by and for advocacy
groups seeking to craft CBAs, with the
exception of a recent article highlighting
how practitioners can consider CBAs as
part of their work (Wolf-Powers, 2010).
This chapter presents a detailed case
study analysis of five major real estate
development projects in NYC. Projects
range from new mixed-use development to
redevelopment of existing structures, from
a stadium to a sizable university expansion.
Case examples were selected using six
criteria: being known for involving intense
public benefits negotiations or fights,
including public money (subsidies) in
the project, being relatively large (either
involving many hundreds of thousands
of dollars or significant square footage),
threatening serious impacts on the
surrounding community, including of
some type of benefits agreement, and
my ability as a researcher to access
information related to each project. For
each case study example, this chapter
presents a brief project synopsis, followed
by a description of the negotiation process,
a review of the interests represented,
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an analysis of the benefits requested,
an overview of the end product and
implementation arrangements, and a list
of the fiscal accountability measures that
were imposed. Each of these projects has
been researched online, by review of public
documents, and when possible, through
interviews with individuals from the city,
community groups, or developers involved
directly with the project.
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A. The Bronx Gateway Terminal
Market (BTM) (2006)
The BTM redevelopment
negotiations were something
of a sham. There was
inadequate representation of
key community interests and
little or no fiscal accountability
or implementation measures.
The case raises serious
questions of legitimacy and
fairness around a benefits
document that was ultimately
signed between the developer,
elected officials, and a few
community groups.
Synopsis
The mall development plan, including
displacement of existing businesses and
disputes around public benefits, made the
BTM a controversial project. The BTM
was originally a market center in the South
Bronx constructed in the 1920s. Over time,
the marketbecame known for its ethnic food
vendors, most of them small businesses.
The market was mired in litigation between
the landlord and the tenants over needed
repairs; by some accounts, the property
had become blighted (Berger, 2009). In
2004, the Related Companies (Related),
a prominent NYC real estate developer,
acquired a lease from the NYCEDC for the
BTM site. Related knew that the project
was going to be controversial from the start
since 200 employees at the existing site were
likely to lose their jobs. In 2006, Related's
development proposal - construction of a
mall of nearly 1 million square feet - was
approved by the City Council (Lavine,
2009). The project ultimately cost $500M,
and received subsidies from the City via tax
breaks. The City also paid for demolition
of the existing structures (Berger, 2009).
The Bronx Overall Economic Development
Corporation (BOEDC), the Borough
President's quasi-public economic
development agency focused on the
Bronx's development, decided to pursue
a CBA as a way of deriving maximum
benefits from the BTM development for
Bronx residents. For many stakeholders,
including community groups, local elected
officials and city representatives, the BTM
represented a huge investment in the
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South Bronx - a neighborhood undergoing
slow reinvestment after decades of
disinvestment, unemployment, and hard
times (Craytor, 2011).
Related's lawyer, Jesse Masyr described
the existing market conditions: "We had a
particular sensitivity to BTM because we knew
we were going to create a significant uproar.
The market, whatever you want to say of it,
was somewhat functioning. It was decrepit...
the first day we went to the site, I was standing
there with either the captain or the lieutenant of
the police department, and he looks at me and
says 'blow it up' as he's standing there. But
there were 200 employees there and it was, I
felt, going to be a controversial issue" (Jesse
Masyr, real estate and land use lawyer).
Representation
Despite an initial nod in the direction of
inclusion and community representation,
Community Based Organizations (CBOs)
were ultimately excluded from negotiations
due to political influence, and there were
not able to represent their own interests,
raising concerns about legitimacy and
accountability in the benefits negotiation.
Miquela Craytor, economic development
director of BOEDC at the time of the project,
determined that building a community
coalition to negotiate benefits with Related
would be a viable option, and realized
that representation of community groups
would be a critical element of the process
(Craytor, 2011). Related also realized that
community benefits would be necessary to
help assuage the controversy over evicting
current BTM tenants prior to demolition,
and approached the Borough President's
office to propose a CBA (Masyr, 2010). The
BOEDC moved forward to convene a group
of community groups to discuss possible
community benefits. Environmentalists,
workforce activists, faith groups, and
others participated in smaller committees
to address individual topics, such as
jobs and public health. Craytor believed
these groups represented the community,
though no comparison to demographics
was officially conducted (Craytor, 2011).
Despite BOEDC's public portrayal that
there was broad and deep representation
of community interests, some community
groups and Related acknowledged that
the BOEDC (on behalf of the Borough
President) had decided which groups
should be involved rather than convening
a truly broad spectrum of groups
who represented the widest variety of
community interests (Craytor, 2011;
Masyr, 2010).
In hindsight, Craytor notes that she "didn't
realize that they [BOEDC leadership]
essentially were trying to handpick groups that
would legitimize the process and not get in the
way, and that had some legitimacy and support
toward the Borough President, and in short,
they were trying to handpick the right groups
so they would get the right coverage and that
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the project would get through without anyone
stopping the developer because the Borough
President wanted the development to move
forward. What trumped everything else was
getting the project done" (Miquela Craytor,
Sustainable South Bronx Executive Director).
Process
According to stakeholders on all sides, the
process was a sham. The group broke into
committees to address benefits by topic
and develop a list of requests, after which it
employed the services of pro-bono lawyer
Gavin Kearney to work with Craytor to
craft a legal document along the lines of a
successful California CBAs (Craytor, 2011).
The group of community stakeholders
thought they would be negotiating
directly with Related. A representative
from the Borough President's office who
was participating in the discussions
was secretly reporting back to Related.
Related and the Borough President were
concurrently meeting about the possibility
of a CBA and what it might involve. Their
discussions were entirely separate from
the community meetings (Craytor, 2011).
Well into the process, a Bronx-based
environmental justice group called
Sustainable South Bronx (SSB) realized that
elected officials were not going to allow
community groups to speak for themselves
or negotiate on their own behalf, and "that
the community groups around the table
were not truly empowered in the way that
they thought they were"(Craytor, 2011).
SSB alerted the other community groups,
and the BOEDC consequently removed
SSB from the task force and refused them
access to future negotiations. In the interim,
BOEDC and Related met, and Related
proposed its own version of a CBA without
speaking to the community groups or
reviewing the CBA it had in mind. Related
ultimately negotiated benefits through the
Borough President's office, though Craytor
was able to raise many of the points
generated by community groups and two
representatives from the initial community
task force were included.
Masyr reports that he "basically negotiated
with the elected officials... I mean there were
community groups, but bullshit, Bronx
Terminal Market was negotiated with elected
officials...at Bronx Terminal Market, we didn't
really have a community coalition. I negotiated
that deal with the BP and the City Council
who... were very much at odds" (Jesse Masyr,
real estate and land use lawyer).
Craytor has similar recollections: "the people
that were actually empowered with the position
to negotiate wasn't the community. It was
really the elected officials who took info from
the community, but the community wasn't
really the ones across the table from Related,
the developer" (Miquela Craytor, Sustainable
South Bronx Executive Director).
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Benefits
The community task force created a robust
list of requests including the community
benefits it felt were most important.
These included business development
services (contracts, mentoring, space for
small businesses), $3M for local hiring
and job training (first source hiring),
environmental provisions (particularly
around polluted air), and other provisions
(no Wal-Mart, pedestrian scale design
features, protections/amenities for a
buyer shopping club, below market rent
childcare, meeting space for Community
Board 4) (Lavine, 2009).
End Product and Implementation
The end product and the mechanisms to
ensure implementation generated further
questions about legitimacy, accountability,
potential enforcement, and fairness. In
2006, an agreement discussing benefits
provisions was signed between Related
and BOEDC. Only 3 of the 18 CBOs
originally involved in the preliminary task
force signed it; the rest abstained. The
document states that it is a Community
Benefits Agreement signed between the
Developer and "the Coalition," which is
defined only as the organizations signing
the document ("Gateway Center at Bronx
Terminal Market Community Benefits
Agreement," 2006). The contract requires
Related to provide regular reports of
benefit provisions to the Coalition. It states
that Related must make good faith efforts to
fulfill its obligations. If the Coalition thinks
Related has defaulted on the agreement, it
can demand arbitration or take other legal
action. Ultimately, if Related does not fulfill
its obligations, it must pay the Coalition
up to $600,000 in damages. The Coalition,
for its part, must provide oversight of
all benefits activities and report to the
community at large. The developer is not
responsible for ensuring that the Coalition
or any partner organizations fulfill their
responsibilities ("Gateway Center at Bronx
Terminal Market Community Benefits
Agreement," 2006).
With respect to benefits, the contract
includes aspirational goals with few
numbers and no means of enforcement.
Contract language provides loopholes. For
example, "In order to improve the impact of
the project on employment of the members
of the Priority Areas, the Developer will
encourage and use reasonable efforts
to participate with local unions and
community based organizations and
educational institutions" for training
services ("Gateway Center at Bronx
Terminal Market Community Benefits
Agreement," 2006). Language such as 'use
reasonable efforts' and 'encourage' do not
mandate implementation.
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Finances
Subsidies
According to Good Jobs NY', Related
received $133.93 million in subsidies,
including $7 million in Industrial
Development Authority benefits through a
mortgage recording tax exemption, $109.63
million in property tax abatement, $6.09
million in sales tax exemption, $7.1 million
in capital contribution for demolition, and
$4.1 million for relocation payments (G. J.
N. York). The large amounts of subsidies
provided contribute to some community
members' belief that the developer should
be able to make benefits payments, given
the amount of funds the developer was
receiving from the City writ large.
Fiscal accountability
Since the BTM CBA was signed in
2006, there have been charges of fiscal
impropriety involving BOEDC, including
a disagreement over who would receive
the funds. Ultimately it was agreed that the
funds would go to the Borough President
through BOEDC, but that the executive
director of benefits administration would
be appointed by the City Council. There
was no discussion of how funds would
ultimately be administered, or how
benefits such as job training and hiring
provisions would be implemented. Many
of the community groups involved were
1 Good Jobs NY is an organization jointly
staffed by the non-partisan research and analysis
organizations Good Jobs First and the Fiscal Policy
Institute.
dependent on the Borough President
for funding, and it was unclear which
organizations would ultimately receive
funds to implement benefits programming
(Masyr, 2010).
Numerous charges have been investigated
regarding fiscal monitoring and
accountability of funds at BOEDC.
"In July 2009, a lawsuit was filed by
the CBA Administrator charging the
Bronx Overall Economic Development
Corporation (BOEDC) with diverting
$1.6 million promised in the CBA for job
development towards BOEDC salaries.
The Bronx Borough President initiated
an investigation September 2009, which
determined that BOEDC had used the
funds for payroll expenses for its Fast
Track program"(Agreements, 2010).
Masyr says that the contract itself lends itself
to havoc around fiscal accountability: "If you
look at the BTM CBA, you 'l see a clause that...
makes no sense at all. We agreed to $3M in
funding. We the developer, were the sole party
who would decide what to do with $3M dollars.
Why would you let a developer be responsible?
I could have made that check out to anybody"
(Jesse Masyr, real estate and land use lawyer).
"How do you spend the money in an intelligent
manner? What happened in the Bronx is a good
example - nobody stole the money, but it wasn't
spent on what it was supposed to be spent on"
(Masyr, 2010)
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Resulting questions
The public benefits negotiations that
occurred at BTM raise several important
questions: how could the process have
been structured so that all the relevant
community groups were really involved,
and the developer and the city were held
accountable for living up to the agreements
that were made? What is the appropriate
role of elected officials vs. community
organizations in CBA negotiations, and
how should a developer interact with each?
From a management perspective, is there a
better way to manage a CBA negotiation
process?
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B. Kingsbridge Armory
(2006-2009)
The Kingsbridge
Armory public
benefits negotiations
involved a strong
community coalition
that represented
a wide range of
community voices
in a process pushing
for a CBA focused on
the issue of "living
wages." Living
wages in this scenario means an hourly
wage that a working adult needs to earn to
pay for basic needs such as housing, food,
transportation, and clothing. It differs
from minimum wage and involves a wage
rate that covers real costs.' The project
ultimately died at the City Council vote, the
conclusion of ULURP, and subsequently,
no benefits agreement was ever executed.
Synopsis
The KingsbridgeArmoryis a 575,000 square
foot landmark building that comprises an
entire city block in the Northwest Bronx in
one of the poorest census tracts in New York
City. The Armory was largely abandoned
after the National Guard ceased operations
1 For an interesting overview of more re-
cent living wage campaigns and debate, see http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/magazine/15wage.
html?pagewanted=3&_r=1
there in 1993 (Mogilevich, 2010). The
building is located in Education Mile, an
area that includes the Bronx High School
of Science, Monroe College, and Lehman
College (Judd, 2008). The controversial
development proposal included
converting the Armory into a mall with
other mixed-use development (Lavine,
2008b). The developer, Related (the same
developer of the Bronx Terminal Market),
proposed building 'The Shops at the
Armory,' a mall with "destination anchor
retail development, coupled with specialty
and local retail, restaurants, a cinema and
community space. Other proposed features
include a recreational facility, catering and
banquet space, outdoor open space with
a seasonal farmers' market and cafe, and
parking for 400 cars "(NYCEDC, 2008).
According to Related, the redevelopment
would have created 1,800 construction
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jobs and 2,000 permanent jobs. Reports
indicate that Related intended to invest
approximately $310 million to acquire and
redevelop the Armory (NYCEDC, 2008).
A coalition of community groups incubated
at the Northwest Bronx Community and
Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC) called the
Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment
Alliance (KARA) pushed for a CBA based
on a variety of principles, including
living wage jobs and community space
(Pilgrim Hunter). In 2009, Bronx Borough
President Diaz and KARA presented a
draft CBA to Related. The developers'
representatives declared, "a living wage
clause would be a 'deal killer""(PlanNYC,
2010b). In response, Diaz declared that he
would only support the project if a CBA
containing such a clause were signed. The
project moved forward to the City Council
without a CBA included. In December
2009, the City Council voted against the
proposal 45-1, representing the first time
in Bloomberg's administration that the
Council disapproved a development
project. Council members cited traffic
and parking concerns, in addition to the
absence of a living wage provision. In
March 2010, Diaz named a task force to
work on moving forward with the Armory
redevelopment (PlanNYC, 2010b).
Process
Negotiations initially involved
collaboration between the City and KARA
to prepare an RFP to which prospective
developers would have to respond. Once
a developer was selected, negotiations
around public benefits ground to a halt as
the developer and the Coalition reached
loggerheads. Although the Coalition did
not meet its goal of putting a CBA in place,
it succeeded in forming a strong coalition
that was ultimately pleased that the project
was halted. This type of strong community
network turns out to be central to all
successful CBA negotiations examined in
this thesis.
The City (City Hall and the NYCEDC) was
aware that from the start KARA wanted
a CBA, but that was not something the
administration was wiling to support at
that time. Thus, the City decided instead
to push towards an extensive, upfront
community engagement process that
would allow the RFP, developer selection
process, and ultimately the project, to
reflect community concerns but not
empower direct community involvement
in a CBA negotiation (Wambua).
Community representatives, including
KARA, participated in a task force with the
NYCEDC to write the project RFP, which
prescribed a retail center development.
Three proposals were ultimately received
(Pilgrim Hunter). Related was selected to
be the developer, and task force meetings
continued throughout ULURP to negotiate
and discuss various benefits as well as
site use and development. In hindsight,
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both KARA leadership and Related's
legal representation note that KARA was
fundamentally opposed to the proposed
development, meaning the living wage
debate was directly linked to the proposed
use, not just the associated benefits.
In partnership with the Borough President,
KARA ultimately proposed a CBA that
included a variety of requests, including
a mandatory living wage provision that
Related rejected. The City made it clear
that although they were supportive of
community involvement, they would
not support a CBA. KARA would not
settle for anything less than a CBA. The
project collapsed when it was voted down
at the City Council, the first time a real
estate project shepherded by Bloomberg's
administration was unsuccessful. The City
ceased further efforts to produce a new
developmentplan. The BoroughPresident's
office convened a new task force in 2010 to
lead the redevelopment process; the task
force includes KARA, former Comptroller
Ned Regan, Steven McInnis, political
director for the New York City District
Council of Carpenters, Majora Carter
(founder of Sustainable South Bronx),
the chair of Bronx Community Board 7,
Jack Kittle, political director of District
Council 9, Council Member Cabrera, the
new Senator elect, a Steven M. Safyer, MD,
President and CEO of Montefiore Medical
Center, the president of the BOEDC,
the CEO of a Partnership for New York,
Jack Rosen, Chief Executive of Rosen
Partners LLC and a representative from
educational institutions (("Diaz announce
new Kingsbridge Armory Task Force,"
2010; Pilgrim-Hunter, 2010). The city
administration is not involved; Borough
President Diaz states that he invited EDC
president Seth Pinsky to join the task force;
Pinsky declined (Kratz, 2010).
"As a developer, I don't care. It's costing me x,
and once I've acknowledged the cost, I've spent
the money. So that's why I'm nervous talking
about Kingsbridge as a community benefits
agreements. I think it's a better example of the
process and why the process matters and when
you fuck with it, why you pay the price" (Jesse
Masyr, real estate and land use lawyer).
Representation
The depth and breadth of KAR A's coalition
was impressive, earning it the support of
Bronx elected officials. The initial project
task force, convened by the City, included
the NYCEDC, City Hall, a State Assembly
representative, BOEDC, the Borough
President's office, the Community Board,
and KARA. KARA created the broadest
coalition it could after studying many
successful CBAs, particularly the original
flagship agreements in California. The
broader the coalition the more leverage
they would have over the negotiations.
KARA included unions, clergy, CBOs,
local elected officials, schools, and others
(Pilgrim-Hunter, 2010). Ultimately, the
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Borough President supported the coalition,
which gave KARA credibility with the City
Council.
"We included everyone we could to circumvent
interference in our being able to negotiate. We
had unions, our clergy, CBOs, local electeds
supporting us; we had schools - a very, very
broad coalition. One of the things that Related
didn't anticipate...was the coalition" (Desiree
Pilgrim Hunter, community advocate).
Benefits
KARA views the Armory as a potential
multi-use building that could address
numerous problems plaguing the Bronx:
affordable recreation to address obesity
and public health concerns, jobs with good
salaries to tackle un/underemployment,
technical training programs to develop a
skilled workforce, a connection to schools
since Bronx schools are overcrowded
(and the Armory sits on Education mile),
and community meeting space since the
Armory is the "fulcrum" of the community
- it is the center of Kingsbridge Heights, and
given its size, could be a central resource
(Pilgrim-Hunter, 2010). KARA's platform
also included requests for space for non-
profit cultural institutions, retailers that
serve the community while also preserving
the market for existing businesses outside
the armory, environmental protection, the
ability for workers to freely join a union,
safe union construction jobs, and a living
wage that provides dignity for workers
(KARA, 2011).
These ideas were derived from a charrette
that KARA hosted. Living wages and first
source hiring were two of the fundamental
community asks, particularly since KARA
was not entirely supportive of the mall
development ("Campaigns and Programs:
Redeveloping the Kingsbridge Armory,"
2011; Pilgrim-Hunter, 2010). The group
also demanded environmental and safety
improvements given the likely increase in
vehicular traffic. For many of these issues,
KARA and its members consulted with
field experts from local or national CBOs
to inform their asks and decision making
(Pilgrim-Hunter, 2010).
"In exchange [for the negative impacts], they
were putting in what I call a poverty wage
center, a Wal-mart in sheep's clothing... 1200
part time, low-wage no-benefit jobs. The
issue there is now you've sentenced the next
generation of kids into poverty" (Desiree
Pilgrim Hunter, community advocate).
"Who was driving living wages? The retail
workers union, and everybody drank the Kool-
aid - KARA, other trade unions, of course we
want living wages - you sound like an evil
person if you are against it" (Jesse Masyr, real
estate and land use lawyer).
"They wanted us to say that we would make
our tenant pay a rate inconsistent with all
their other facilities, and we said no from day
one. We won't do it, we can't do, it renders the
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project unfinancible to us" (Jesse Masyr, real
estate and land use lawyer).
Resulting questions
The benefits negotiations and challenges
at Kingsbridge Armory raise several im-
portant questions: how should the City
work with a coalition of community orga-
nizations, and what role can and should
community groups play in formulating
a development project? Can the City's
outreach process prior to Uniform Land
Use and Review Process be sufficient to
address benefits concerns and develop-
ment programming? How can the balance
of power between the City and Borough
President be addressed with respect to
negotiating CBA? What are the long-term
impacts that a CBA could have in NYC?
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C. Yankee Stadium (2006)
The benefits negotiations
and agreement associated
with Yankee Stadium
have been reported to be
illegitimate, unaccountable,
and unenforceable by press,
academic blogs, Bronx-based
community organizations,
and community advocates.
No community groups M
were involved, and the
final agreement is hardly
responsive to the project's
negative impacts.
Synopsis
The New York Yankees' (the
Yankees) new stadium, along
with three nearby parking
garages (with nearly 5,000
spaces), 1 block north of their
former location at East 161st St
and River Avenue in the Bronx,
has been highly controversial since it was
proposed in 2004 (PlanNYC, 2010c). The
new stadium and parking garages were
constructed on public parkland (Good
Jobs NY Insider Baseball) in the middle of
popular and highly used Macombs Dam
and Mulally parks (News, 2006). By 2005,
the New York State legislature had moved
to de-map the two parks on which the
Yankees proposed to build. De-mapping
means permitting a zoning change that
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acombs Dam Park, July 2006 (NYC Parks Advocates)
Macombs Dam Park, July 2008 (NYC Parks Advocates)
allows for alternative uses. This decision
allowed the project to move forward into
the seven-month long Uniform Land Use
Review Process (ULURP). In November
2005, "Community Board 4 recommended
that the project be rejected, largely on
grounds that excessive public funding
[was being provided] and inadequate
replacements for lost parkland. Despite
growing opposition, the City Planning
Commission unanimously endorsed the
project the following February" (PlanNYC,
2010c). The Yankees threatened to leave
the city if they were not granted significant
subsidies (Press, 2008), and the City was
willing to support the Yankees at the
perceived cost of Bronx residents.
Community opposition, primarily led by
non-profit watchdog group NYC Parks
Advocate, was driven by feelings that the
proposed replacement parks were highly
inadequate. These replacement parks
were to be "scattered on separate parcels,
including the tops of parking garages.
The new recreational spaces would be
closer to the highway and train tracks
and an additional five-minute to half-
hour walk from where people live. Most
of the trees would be cut down. The new
stadium would go directly in the middle
of the community's current park, next to
a residential area" (Schwartz, 2006). This
was a huge concern to the mostly black
and Hispanic community, which suffers
the highest asthma and obesity rates in the
city, but the "lowest ratio of parkland to
1,000 residents" (Schwartz, 2006).
Representation
This project is known for its exclusion of
community groups and local input. In
2006, the Yankees signed a CBA with
former Borough President Adolfo Carrion,
and Council members Maria Baez (who
is no longer in office), Joel Rivera and
Maria Del Carmen Arroyo (known as
the Bronx Delegation) (Cilberto, 2010).
The agreement was negotiated without
any participation of community groups,
including those active in speaking out
around the parks and public health issues,
and was perceived as highly illegitimate by
community groups, advocates, academics,
and land use lawyers (PlanNYC, 2010c).
Process
Information about the negotiating process
is largely unavailable, and former elected
officials involved are unwilling to speak
about it. Popular press repeatedly
highlights criticism of the CBA, and states
that an agreement was signed without
discussion of the negotiating process.
The opaque process leads to questions of
legitimacy and the accountability of the
officials involved.
Benefits
Community groups, for example,
Sustainable South Bronx and NYC Park
Advocates, raised benefits concerns
directly related to the project. Primary
issues raised by opposing groups included
parks (rehabilitation and new areas to
replace 20 acres of parkland used for
the stadium) (Lavine, 2008c), traffic and
environmental mitigation, and concern
over fiscal accountability regarding the
use of public funds (PlanNYC, 2010d). The
final agreement committed the Yankees
to the following provisions that do not
reflect most of these community concerns:
funds to Bronx community organizations
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($800,000/year from 2006-2046, put into
a trust fund), $100,000 of equipment and
15,000 ticket donations to Bronx groups
(PlanNYC, 2010c), 25% of construction
jobs for Bronx residents, 25% of stadium
contracting to Bronx firms (Wolf-Powers,
2010). $10M was contributed toward new
parks (est. total cost is $115M) (PlanNYC,
2010d). The misalignment between
requested benefits, which focus on
negative impacts such as traffic and health
concerns, and benefits provided, such as
Yankees tickets and sports equipment,
demonstrate the lack of community input
into the process. In addition, strong fiscal
accountability measures were not put into
place.
"I was almost offended that they were going to
sign it. You have the poorest borough in the
city, and this is what you are contemplating
signing with the richest team? Are you kidding
me?" (Miquela Craytor, Sustainable South
Bronx Executive Director).
"Yankee stadium was not really a CBA,
more a statement of charitable intent"
Masyr, real estate and land use lawyer).
it was
(Jesse
End Product and Implementation
The commitments made in the contract, and
the implementation of those commitments,
have been fraught with controversy. The
contract itself, signed in 2006, includes
agreements made between the developer
and the Bronx Coalition of local elected
officials, without the involvement of any
community organizations. The contract
notes the appointment of a Program
Administrator whose role is to implement
and monitor benefits commitment, with
$450,000 per year to cover staff and program
costs. The Administrator's responsibilities
largely include outreach, business
improvement district management (to
improve commercial districts), MWBE
certification (to help minority and women
owned businesses become certified as such,
therefore making them eligible to receive
certain contracts), technical assistance,
information provision, mentoring,
monitoring and reporting. The contract
closes with a statement that the Yankees are
held to this contract by the Courts of New
York State ("Yankee Stadium Community
Benefits Agreement," 2006).
The established Community Benefits trust
fund is to be administered by an appointee
and advisory board of elected officials
involved with the benefits negotiations
(Lavine, 2008c) - the same officials who
signedthebenefitsagreement. "Community
groups denied a role in the process claimed
that this amounted to a "slush fund"
that would be doled out to politically
favored causes" (PlanNYC, 2010c). In
2008, the media highlighted community
outrage, as the Yankees had not made
CBA payments as promised and already
were arrears by $1M. A representative of
the benefits advisory panel (a group that
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many community members and the press
doubt existed) stated that disbursement of
funds would begin the next month, and
that they would be concentrated in the
community board districts most impacted
by the development (Meminger, 2008). An
independent monitor (an individual) is
reported to be overseeing local hiring and
contracting (Wolf-Powers, 2010), though
this is difficult to confirm.
"Yankee Stadium [CBAI is horrific, it was bad
on all accounts, there was no accountability,
there was no connection to the job piece...
there's no way to make the Yankees basically
follow through on these promises, there's no
transparency of how they are reaching their
numbers or what they constitute as hiring and
job numbers" (Miquela Craytor, Sustainable
South Bronx Executive Director)
Finances
Subsidies
The project cost an estimated $1.5B. A
variety of subsidies were provided by
multiple sources. City subsidies totaled
$300M (Pesca, 2009); while the "IDA
[Industrial Development Authority]
issued $942M in tax-exempt bonds...
plus an additional $370.9M in bonds in
2009 - $259M of which are tax-exempt"
(PlanNYC, 2010d). There has been
continued controversy with regard to
fiscal accountability both over provision of
subsidies as well as opaque and impartial
channels of fund management" (PlanNYC,
2010c). There was considerable feeling
that the City bent over backwards to
keep the Yankees in NYC at significant
cost and possible illegal dealings. In
a Congressional panel hearing related
to the investigation over inappropriate
subsidy provision, NYC officials stated
that "they didn't do anything improper
in shepherding through $1.3 billion in
financing for a new Yankee Stadium, but
the assurances did little to mollify the
congressman who is investigating the deal.
At issue was a six-fold increase in the city's
assessed value of the land, to around $200
million. Rep. Dennis Kucinich, an Ohio
Democrat, suggested the reason was to
make it easier to get tax-exempt bonds to
pay for the construction of the ballpark in
the South Bronx" (Press, 2008). The City
and the Yankees maintain that nothing was
done illegally, while critics believe that the
subsidies are questionable.
With respect to the benefits fund, reports
indicate that although the Yankees have
met their obligations to pay into the fund,
the charity has been continuously ensnared
in ongoing controversy. In 2008-2009, press
and reports like PlanNYC from NYU's
Furman Center on Real Estate question
whether or not the fund administrator,
managed by Michael Drezin, had
actually dispersed any of the funds to
community groups. PlanNYC further
notes that information about the fund's
operations, disbursement patterns, and
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follow through are unavailable (PlanNYC,
2010d). Problems continued into 2009
when Drezin was fired after claiming that
the Yankee's first payment was deposited
in a non-interest bearing account at a bank
founded by the community benefits fund's
chairman. As of 2010, the two parties were
still in litigation, though there is no recent
information available as to the status of the
controversy, or who replaced Drezin (Wolf-
Powers, 2010).
"...there was a big pot of money that was
going to some subgroup that was going to be
handpicked by elected officials. Can you make it
even more obvious that this is your slush fund
for electeds?" (Miquela Craytor, Sustainable
South Bronx Executive Director).
Resulting questions
The Yankees Stadium benefits negotiations
raise several critical questions: should it
be mandatory that community groups
be included in negotiating community
benefits agreements? Who should monitor
operations and funds related to benefits
agreements, and what structures or rules
should be put in place to ensure fiscal
accountability and transparency? In
instances when community groups feel
that elected officials are not representing
their needs, what recourse do they have?
Should benefits agreements be permitted
to provide a kitty of money, rather than
ensuring that specific actions are taken?
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D. East 125* St. Mixed Media
Development (2006-2008)
The East 125* Street Mixed Media
Development project provides a unique
example of a negotiations process convened
by the City that maintained a goal of
substantial community representation
and continued community involvement.
A community task force helped write the
project RFP, and the ultimate contract
between the City and the development
team included the promise of various
benefits; no separate CBA was signed.
Synopsis
The East Harlem Media/Entertainment/
Cultural Center (East Harlem M/E/C)
is a mixed use redevelopment on
approximately 6 acres, comprised of three
parcels bounded by Second and Third
Avenues and 125' and 127t Streets, as well
as a small parcel on the corner of 125* St
and Third Avenue (NYCEDC, 2007). After
a city-led planning process for the project
site failed in 2005, the City partnered with
a community task force, comprised of the
local Council member (Mark-Viverito)
and community organizations, to form
a development project that met City
desires and local community needs. The
Community Board and local organizations
initially asked for a CBA; City Hall
countered by supporting the organization
of the task force to work through
community issues and needs. The group
ultimately conceived of, proposed, and
approved a redevelopment of "1.7-million-
square-foot project includes office and
retail space, a small hotel, a cultural
center, open space and 800 apartments,
600 of which will be set aside for families
with low and moderate incomes" (Bagli,
2008). There will additionally be a cinema,
media center, open space and plaza (Arak,
2010). The project has been heralded
in the press, City Hall, elected officials,
and local community groups as being a
better, community-driven process that
incorporates community benefits and
needs. However, there has been some
controversy with regard to use of eminent
domain, as the City initially only owned
82% of the mostly vacant parcels and
negotiated with private owners for the
remaining property (Bagli, 2008).
Representation
Local community groups had previously
defeated a city proposal for this site in
2005, following which City Hall reached
out to Council member Mark-Viverito and
the Community Board to develop a task
force that would address local concerns
and reformulate the project (Bagli, 2008).
According to East Harlem Preservation,
a local organization, and the NYCEDC,
the East 125t St. Taskforce members
included representatives of the following
community organizations: Office of the
Manhattan Borough President, City
Council, Manhattan Community Board 11,
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AK Houses, Harlem Neighborhood Block
Association, Homeowners Association
of East Harlem, Jackie Robinson Houses
Tenant Association, PS 30 Parent
Association, East 127th Street Block
Association, Boriken Health Center, Youth
Action Program & Homes, WE ACT for
Environmental Justice, Housing Here and
Now, as well as project leads from City
Hall and the NYCEDC (NYCEDC, 2007).
George Sarkissian, District Manager of
Community Board 11, confirmed this wide
representation, and noted that although
a few groups dropped off the task force
during its two years of meetings prior
to selecting a developer, he still felt it
was representative of the community
(Sarkissian, 2011).
"In the instance of East 12 5 '" St, which was
a very protracted negotiation process, what
happened was... upon discussions with the CB
and the Council person, we asked them to put
together a representative panel of individuals
that would serve as a task force that could be
directly engaged. Of course they would be a
part, and it would also give seats at the table for
a broad cross section - non-profits, principals,
interested parties - so they did this very
effectively. They went out and put together
a task force that was really extensive" (Matt
Wambua, former Senior Policy Advisor to the
Mayor).
"The task force was created; they met with EDC
several times to talk about what they wanted to
see built through this development and it became
really clear to EDC that what the community
wanted and that what the [developers] selected
by the previous administration were willing to
do were two very different things so they de-
designated them. They started a brand new
RFP process. So all of these elements that were
coming out of this initial conversation with
the task force, which was at this point pretty
grassroots...came into the RFP development,
which is pretty key, and it was a community
driven process"(George Sarkissian, District
Manager of CB 11).
Process
Starting in 2006, the East 1 2 5 St. task
force met every other week for two years
to specify development principles, project
goals, and community benefits before
ULURP, with a goal of developing a
project RFP that reflected the communities
needs, desires, and was financially feasible
(NYCEDC,2007;Sarkissian,2011;Wambua,
2010). This process occurred largely prior
to ULURP, as City Hall's goal was to ensure
that negotiations were conducted prior to
ULURP and to avoid CBA discussions at
all costs. Thus, they wanted to make sure
the project RFP included the community's
expectations and needs. The final RFP
that was released by the EDC highlights
the community planning process and
involvement of the Task Force in detail on
page 2, and continues to refer to Task Force
involvement throughout the document
(NYCEDC, 2006; Sarkissian, 2011).
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The meetings were facilitated by City Hall
advisor Matt Wambua and an EDC Senior
Project Manager. The Community Board
District Manager notes that Wambua's
involvement was critical, as he provided
official representation from the Mayor's
office as well as a commitment to and
deep understanding of working with
community groups (Sarkissian)'. The
Taskforce reviewed project proposals, and
ultimately selected the development team
and approved the project over the course of
a second year of meetings (NYCEDC, 2007;
Sarkissian, 2011; Wambua, 2010). Most
groups remained involved throughout
the negotiations. Council member Mark-
Viverito is quoted in several media sources
as saying "This is a model for how planning
and economic development should be done
in the future.. .we have produced a project
that is in tune with the community"(Bagli,
2008).
While the community planning process,
including the RFP development, developer
selection, and ultimate agreement, is
regarded by most stakeholders as being
1 When asked about City Hall's involve-
ment in the process, CB11 District Manager
George Sarkissian notes that Matt Wambua was in-
volved in...".. .every conversation! I wouldn't say
every conversation actually, the task force would
meet and identified various elements of the project
and took them one by one. We'd have a meeting
about housing, and we'd create what we'd call 'ele-
ments of consensus' - points that we thought were
elements that needed to be included in the project,
and then we'd meet with EDC to get EDC's take on
them, do a little back and forth, and create some
sort of compromise"(Sarkissian).
exemplary, George Sarkissian notes
concern about the final week of the
process. Immediately prior to the City
Council vote, community benefits had still
not been finalized or agreed to, and final
negotiations ultimately took place between
the Council member and the developer;
the task force was excluded from the final
stages of the negotiation process and
felt like the process had been taken over
(Sarkissian, 2011).
"In many respects...the negotiations were
before ULURP in order to better formulate the
general benefits that were going to be [included]
but also with the expectations that they would
be ongoing through ULURP... the intent of my
projects was always to create a longer build
up time that allowed for more substantive
negotiation so that the project truly reflected
community need" (Matt Wambua, former
Senior Policy Advisor to the Mayor)
"I think what often happens is that in these
community benefits agreements is that an RFP
is released by a municipality, a development
team is selected, and THEN the development
team comes to the community and it's like you
are chipping away at the edges... .if you were in
on it before hand and upfront and determined
[what you wanted] you wouldn't even need this
conversation. That part of the process worked
well. The community task force working to
develop a very detailed RFP - that part was
great. After that, getting these folks together to
meet regular and review proposals works great,
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as long as they get to select a development team
and negotiate a set of community benefits with
them, and I think that was what was missing
in this process" (George Sarkissian, CB11
District Manager).
Benefits
The Task Force asked for a wide range of
benefits, including 700 affordable housing
unit set asides, a local hiring provision that
included prevailing wages and a labor peace
agreement as well as 100 apprenticeship
positions to create union slots for East
Harlem residents, below market rate space
for local businesses (60% of market rate for
space greater than 1,200 square feet, 10% of
gross annual sales for space less than 1,200
square feet), locally owned and controlled
cultural space including a proscenium
stage theater, a small black box theater,
and a digital arts space with fit out funded
by the developer, publically accessible
open space (Office of Communications,
2008), continued local involvement in the
development process, no use of eminent
domain, and information about impacts
on health and local services (Lieber, 2008;
NYCEDC, 2007; Sarkissian, 2011).
Wambua notes that the City did not put
any preconditions on what could or could
not be asked for, and that the group was
willing to consider everything, using cost,
feasibility, and whether the underlying
requested benefit related to the property
and the project as filtering criteria
(Wambua, 2010). Over the span of two
years, the task force considered all of the
benefits listed above, using the internal
expertise of the group to help inform their
decisions (Sarkissian).
"What we did was try to constitute the task
force with two different types of folks. One
werefolks from the community that represented
other people, like tenant associations and local
churches and stuff like that. The other groups
were local CBOs that had that kind of expertise.
We had someone from WEAct to talk about the
environmental issues; we had somebody from
Housing Here and Now, Julie Miles, who had
the housing piece down. We had somebody from
the health community...to talk about the health
concerns. We tried to find expertise to include
in the task force so that when we were talking
to the city, we had that expertise on hand at
the negotiation" (George Sarkissian, CB11
District Manager).
End Product and Implementation
An addendum to the final development
agreement called the Points of Agreement,
signed by the City Council Speaker,
included 30,000 square feet of dedicated
community and cultural space which will
be managed and operated by a local non-
profit group with ownership interests. It
further included more than 600 affordable
housing units, a public plaza, new office and
retail space, a hotel, 50,000 sq ft dedicated to
local retail, a targeted workforce program
run in partnership with the Department of
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Small Business Services, arts and cultural
facility, technical assistance program for
businesses in CB11 district (in part through
a $10M investment fund1), and sustainable
design (Lieber, 2008; NYCEDC, 2007). The
project is slated to achieve a Silver LEED
certification. There were no separate
benefits agreements; all commitments are
included in the development agreement,
and involve commitments from the City
(and its agencies), the developer, and
community groups.
While many of the key issues raised by the
community task force were included in
the RFP and in the Points of Agreement,
analysis by Community Board 11 indicates
that there were several points omitted,
including local apprenticeship positions
and prevailing wages, first source (local)
hiring from the community, local hiring
targets included in tenant leases, the
exact below-market rate formula for local
retail rentals, and construction of cultural
theater space, and no use of eminent
domain (Sarkissian, 2008). The Council
member and task force may still have an
opportunity to negotiate and develop these
benefits with the developer, but they were
not included in the official contract.
The development project stalled due to
the market crash, and experienced further
delays because the primary project partner
went bankrupt. The project has since
been phased; construction began on the
smallest of the three parcels with plans to
build the larger parcels in the future. The
exact timeline is unclear. Sarkissian notes
that Council member Mark-Viverito has
reconvened the task force, which has met
six or seven times since summer of 2010
to discuss implementation plans. During
these meetings, the task force reviewed
the Points of Agreement as well as the
Remaining Elements to be Negotiated.
The group decided that local hiring should
be the first task at hand, since construction
will generate job opportunities. So far,
the developer has met with the task
force to discuss local hiring and appears
amenable, though no program has been
officially established as of early April 2011
(Sarkissian, 2011).
"City says no more CBAs, and then they put
out the RFP for 1 25 th St and 2 nd Ave, and sewn
into the RFP...is CBA. So what they are really
saying is no more CBA...but the underlying
issues in CBA are still there. We've just co-opted
them. You've got to do job training, you've got
to do set asides, you got to build so much space
that's not economical and then give it away,
what's the difference?" The difference is that
1) you don't write a check, and 2) you don't
negotiate with "them" [community groups]...
haven't they just said that all the issues with
CBA are now just part of the project?" (Jesse
Masyr, real estate and land use lawyer)
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Finances
The total project cost totals $700M
(NYCEDC, 2007); Phase I is $23 million
(combination of developer equity and
HPD, the State Department of Housing and
Community Renewal, the City Council,
and NYSERDA) (Drummer, 2010).
Resulting questions
The East Harlem project raises several
questions: is the process model used for
this project (with the City as convener)
one that works and can be replicated for
other projects? Were the methods and
metrics of representation accurate, such
that community groups feel they were
included? Do benefits have a better chance
of being implemented if they are tasked
to city agencies as opposed to community
groups? What impact does the support
of City Hall have on securing community
benefits, regardless of the form of the final
contract?
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E. Columbia
University
Expansion
C o I u m b i aprjc
University's
e x p a n s i o n
throughout West 0 OPME
Harlem, and AM (17c
the resulting
expectationof a CBA P PROPERI
from both the City U Tuck-It-Away stA
and community, N Pmminder and i
resulted in a unique M P.G. Singh Entei
process for benefits
negotiations. A
local development
corporation (LDC)
was formed, and while issues of community
representation and nexus of benefits were
addressed, the case raises questions about
fiscal accountability and the role of the
City in CBA negotiations.
Synopsis
Columbia University (Columbia) is a
prominent educational institution in
northernManhattanintheneighborhoodsof
Morningside Heights and Manhattanville.
Facing pressure of a growing student
body and a need to expand its facilities to
keep pace with its competitor Ivy league
universities, Columbia proposed a 15 -20
year expansion plan to the City. The plan
proposes expanding the campus
footprint by building 6.8 million square
feet of "classrooms, research facilities,
administration, housing, and parking.
The proposed expansion will include
redeveloping 17-acres in a neighborhood
called Manhattanville from W. 125th to
W. 133rd (between Broadway and 12th
Avenue) just north of Columbia's existing
36-acre campus" (PlanNYC, 2010a). The
expansion is estimated to cost $6.3B
across two fifteen-year phases, with
Phase I concluding in 2015 and Phase II
concluding by 2030 (PlanNYC, 2010a).
Columbia notes employment projections
of 6,000 new job opportunities, and the
transformation of "a shabby enclave of
auto-repair shops, warehouses, and small
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manufacturing plants into a pedestrian-
friendly environment with more open
space, restaurants and shops" (Lavine,
2008a).
The expansion required a zoning change
for 35 acres across its campus and
surrounding neighborhoods. The change
was approved by the City Council in
2007 and had also received approval
from the Borough President and City
Planning Commission. However,
Community Board 9 (CB9) had rejected
the plan prior to the City Council vote
based on concerns over eminent domain,
displacement of existing businesses, and
threats of gentrification destroying the
affordability of the neighborhood. CB9
had previously collaborated with the
Pratt Center for Community Development
to create a 197-a plan (a local land use
plan) for West Harlem. CB9's proposal
took into account land use as well as
related impacts of land use decisions, and
submitted the plan to City Planning in
1997 (CommunityRepresentative, 2011).
Two years later, Columbia submitted a
197-c land use plan to City Planning that
involved "significant residential and
community facility expansion exclusively
for use by the University. The CPC and
the City Council simultaneously approved
both Columbia's proposal and CB 9's 197-
a plan, despite the contradictions posed
by the divergent plans" (PlanNYC, 2010a)
such as essentially privatizing remaining
developable land and displacing
residents and businesses (Community
Representative, 2011).
In response to community concerns voiced
by CB9, and at the request of Columbia, the
City supported and funded the creation of
a local development corporation - the West
Harlem Local Development Corporation
(LDC) - staffed by a representation of
community organizations. The LDC's
focus was to work with Columbia on
addressing benefits needs and ensure
creation of a successful CBA; the Bloomberg
administration supported CBAs at that
time (around 2007). After significant work
completed by the LDC and with support
from City Hall, Columbia and the LDC
entered into a MOU around community
benefits totaling $150 million (Community
Representative, 2011).
Representation
This project is unique in its creation of a
LDC with appointed community leaders
slated to represent a wide range of interests
(Lavine, 2008a). The local Community
Board initially designed the LDC to
solely include community leaders, and to
exclude elected officials. A community
member closely involved with the entire
process notes that a wide range of groups
were on the board, including housing
advocates, economic development
interests, arts and culture, and more. The
Community Board advertised the LDC
creation and CBA process through local
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newspapers and CBOs in attempts to draw
in the widest range of groups (Community
Representative, 2011). At the first meeting
the LDC chose to include elected officials
going forward, as there was great interest
in the project from elected officials
(Community Representative). In hindsight,
press reports indicate that inclusion of
local elected officials "would prove to be
detrimental to the process.. .as perceptions
arose that they were not representing the
true interests of the community and that
they were inappropriately controlling
negotiations" (Lavine, 2008a). Members
of the LDC, however, have characterized
the elected officials' involvement as
"having too many hands in the pot" and
have observed that while the elected
officials could sometimes move benefits
conversations forward, they often did so
without the LDC, thus leaving out the
range of groups represented on the LDC
board (Community Representative, 2011).
Land use lawyer Jesse Masyr, appointed
by the City to advise the LDC, expressed
concerns over a process that involves
the elected officials who will vote on the
project negotiating the project, particularly
when funds are concerned (Masyr, 2010).
A community member involved in the
entire process states how difficult true
representation was, and how building
consensus internally - particularly over
whether or not to move forward with a CBA
if Columbia would not cease its efforts to
pursue eminent domain - was challenging.
A few groups dropped off the board after
the LDC voted to move forward to pursue
a CBA because they solely wanted to stop
Columbia from using eminent domain,
while the rest of the LDC believed that
the project was going to go through and
wanted to negotiate a CBA (Community
Representative, 2011).
"The problem was that - a lot of them were
very smart and informed - here cometh the
problem. How did they form this organization?
It was an attempt to be democratic... and so
they sort of held these workshops to decide.
Set up all of these different kinds of groups
that should be presented. Preservationists.
Tenants. Landlords. Commercial tenants.
Commercial landlords...anyone who could
possibly want to be here, and then well have a
sort of Athenian town hall meeting, and then
all of the commercial tenants you go over there
in the room and you pick a guy who will be on
the board, and landlords, you pick a guy so we
had this hodge-podge of people... the education
person was a kindergarten teacher" (Jesse
Masyr, real estate and land use lawyer).
"Then you have the other piece of the
equation which is how do you get community
representatives to come out and elect a
representative for their interests who is
committed to reporting back to them... it sounds
very simple on paper but then when you try
to execute it it's a little difficult" (Community
Representative).
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Process
The LDC was started in 2006 with
the encouragement of the Bloomberg
administration, which provided funds,
technical assistance, and later in the process,
a mediator (Community Representative,
2011; Wambua, 2010). Weekly public
meetings started in September 2006,
with working group committees divided
by interest around topics including
"housing, business and economic
development, employment, education,
historic preservation, community
facilities and social services, arts and
culture, environmental stewardship,
transportation, research and laboratory
activities and green spaces" (Lavine,
2008a). City Hall policy advisor Matt
Wambua and lawyer Jesse Masyr were
present at all meetings. Masyr notes that
initially, the negotiations with Columbia
were friendly as the university thought it
would be a straightforward process, but
it ended up being highly contentious. A
community member involved with the
negotiations confirms this, noting that for
a long time, Columbia refused to divulge
how much money they were willing to
spend on community benefits. Once the
LDC had compiled a list of benefits and
totaled up the projected costs, Columbia
realized that the process could cost them up
to $500 million, which is when Columbia
started leaning more towards giving a
much lower sum of money and making it
clear that they were more willing to write
a check than agree to a CBA involving
behavioral commitments (Community
Representative, 2011; Masyr, 2010).
Up until the night before the City Council
vote in 2008, Columbia was still refusing
to sign a CBA. Politics gave the LDC a final
piece of leverage: the Public Authority
Control Board (comprised of votes from the
assembly member, senator, and governor)
needed to approve the project for it to move
forward, and they committed to voting
down the project unless Columbia signed
a CBA (Community Representative, 2011;
Masyr, 2010).
In the eleventh hour, the LDC's lawyers
told Columbia that the LDC would not
sign Columbia's proposed Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) unless Columbia
committed to signing a detailed CBA.
Columbia ultimately signed a MOU with
the LDC for $150 million to fund benefits in
2008 the night before the vote, and signed
a detailed CBA in 2009 with commitments
far beyond donating money (Masyr, 2010).
"There were a couple of things going on. What
the LDC did was they incorporated committees
- there was a committee on housing, a committee
on economic development, arts and culture, and
then invited members who were not members of
the LDC to participate and come up with what
are the ideas, what do we want, and what are
the priorities" (Community Representative).
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Benefits
The LDC operated through a set of topic-
based committees, each with the goal
of developing specific benefits targets
and deliverables. Community members
involved in the negotiations note that
Columbia was reluctant to disclose the
amount of money they were willing to
spend, or what types of benefits they
were willing to fund. The two sides, the
LDC and Columbia, were negotiating in
circles up until the night before the City
Council vote, when Columbia presented
a Memorandum of Understanding to
the LDC with their proposal for benefits
funds. Ultimately, Columbia signed this
MOU with the LDC that provided $150
million of funds and in-kind services to the
LDC in lieu of a more specific community
benefits agreement that details community
use, local hiring provisions, or other topics
commonly found in CBAs (Community
Representative, 2011). The MOU states
that Columbia will provide a
$100 million financial commitment, a
demonstration community public school
in CD9 for a value of $30 million, as well
as in-kind services for a value of $20
million. Of the $100 million, $24 million
will fund an Affordable Housing Fund
and related benefits.. .the balance, $76
million, will be paid over a 12-year period
into a Benefits Fund and will be allocated
by the WHLDC (the LDC) across the
series of CBA priorities (Kovaleff, 2008).
The MOU indicates that a more specific
CBA would be developed at a later date,
and leaves the LDC with the power and
responsibility for allocating funds across
benefit priorities that were not specifically
negotiated previously, as Columbia would
write a check and have fulfilled the majority
of its commitments (Kovaleff, 2008).
A community member explained that the
figure of $150 million was carefully derived.
The LDC examined CBAs around the
country, and noted that the value of CBAs
trend towards 1% of total project costs. The
LDC made the argument that the Columbia
Expansion is unique when compared
to those projects: first, Columbia's plan
would effectively absorb the remaining
developable property in West Harlem, and
second, the development aims to serve
Columbia and its students specifically;
the general public would likely be
excluded from using the land given to the
expansion. Thus, the LDC expected higher
than 1% of project costs to be dedicated
to the CBA. With regard to the specific
funding allocations articulated in the
MOU, this community member noted that
the provision for the affordable housing
fund was negotiated solely by the Borough
President in meetings that excluded the
LDC (Community Representative, 2011).
Following the MOU, a CBA was fully
developed and signed between Columbia
and the WHDC. This CBA details
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benefits far beyond a dollar figure, and
involves commitments on a wide range
of topics including but not limited to a
community school, affordable housing,
fundraising, bulk purchasing programs,
day care, legal services, living wages,
local hiring, construction training,
business development and assistance,
job training, education (pre-school to
college), environmental stewardship,
subway improvements, arts and culture,
community facilities, and historic
preservation (Masyr, 2010; West Harlem
Community Benefits Agreement, 2009).
"We had all these topics, and they were all
legitimate topics of discussion that we wanted
to negotiate with Columbia, but the people who
were heading it were not experts, so when it
came to affordable housing, they didn't have an
affordable housing expert on the board" (Jesse
Masyr, real estate and land use lawyer).
"We were going through these discussions and
negotiations and the specifics without putting
dollar figures on it. And then we were getting
closer and closer to the scheduled datefor the vote
on the Columbia Rezoning - the City Council
vote - and the night before the City Council
vote the LDC got a proposal [from Columbia]
$75M cash, $25M in-kind services, and these
other things that Columbia just through
into the pot just to make it appealing, i.e. the
Teachers College Demonstration school...
Columbia's just throwing stuff in to get to a
$150M number"(Community Representative).
End Product and Implementation
In early 2011, a community representative
indicated that the LDC (West Harlem
Local Development Corporation) has been
dissolved, and a new entity called the
West Harlem Development Corporation
formed. The role of the new organization is
to determine implementation mechanisms
for the points of agreement in the CBA,
and to disburse the grant funds provided
by Columbia. The representative noted
that forming a new group is critical
to implementation, as the grassroots
organizing skills necessary for forming a
coalition and negotiating benefits is very
different from implementation, which
requires legal, accounting, and real estate
skills. The group has recently convened
(Community Representative, 2010). As
of April 2011, the previous legal team has
not been involved in this process (Masyr,
2011).
"That's why the Columbia CBA is really a
check. It's a big check, but it's a just a check,
and I think a lot of it had to do with is that from
the beginning we didn't have the expert talent
at the table to say what Columbia should do.
CBAs to me break into two categories of effort.
One is behavioral and the other is monetary.
You get a lot more out of behavioral than you do
out of monetary" (Jesse Masyr, real estate and
land use lawyer).
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Resulting Questions
This case study raises further questions:
why would a developer or property owner
assume that CBAs are the correct route
to take? Why are community groups
often at odds with elected officials about
what the neighborhood's development
priorities are? What is the right role for
elected officials to take in CBA negotiations
processes? Did the presence of legal counsel
benefit the community groups in their
advocacy for benefits? Does the official
formation of a community entity support
CBA negotiations and achieve community
outcomes?
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Project Project description Stakeholders Finances Community 
asks
31-acre former
food market in the
Southwest Bronx;
purchased by Related
Co in 2004. A 913,000
sq. ft mall was
completed in 2009.
I I .1
Developer, Bronx
political leaders,
BOEDC, some CBOs
on task force (but
not involved in
negotiations)
$500M project; City
offered tax breaks and
paid for demolition
Business development
(contracts, mentoring, space
for small businesses); local
hiring and job training with
specific goals (first source
hiring); environmental
provisions; other provisions
(no Wal-Mart, pedestrian
scale design features,
protections/amenities for a
buyer shopping club, below
market rent childcare,
meeting space for CB4)
Construction of new
stadium 1 block north President Adolfo
stadium i loknt Carrion, Council ($942 million) to new stadium), traffic and
of former stadium members Maria the Yankees, plus environmental mitigation,
th Box aeJolRivera additional $370.9 and concern over fiscal
cae M itel million in bonds in accountability of public
Carn riaDe 2009 -$259 million of funds
me arwhich are tax-exempt
Propotcotsoed15B
reopento NYCEDC, City $18M state/federal Living wage jobs, first
redveopen o a Hall, KARA, State tax breaks from IDA, source hiring, affordable
575,000 sq ft former Asebyrp1 . cit susdis communit recreationarmory into a mall Assemby Brph 75%8Mscot s si center, s e o
tax-exempttection
* with other mixed-use BredCnt' Boough, o5% diouty on$cos for jobs, environmental
development in the presnidents oic, o pr on 20) remediation, Labor Peace
itea o ) agreement
CB11, NYCEDC, Total project Affordable housing. localRedevelopment of Conileber cost--$700M, Phase hiring provision, below
six acres (2 million Mark-Viverito, I is $23 million market rate space for
square feet of Community task (combination of businesses, cultural space,
commercial space) force (inclding developer equity open space, promoting
into retail,(medialandtHPDath
CBOs and residents) arts and culture, local
restaurants, cinema, involved i F/ State Department involvement in the
open space and selection process, of Housing and d p n
affordable housing in CiyHl Myrs Comunty Renewal, evefomtinat ocess,East Harlem. CficHalle(Mayor the City Council, and nonest aou t tri cts
Office)fiSERDA)scal
Broad range, including
affordable housing.
A local LDC cultural space, public
Prpse*Yed of health accommodations,16-18 new educational CBlocaelete business assistance,
buildings around Hals, l tete Total project cost is workforce training and
0Columbia's West ofrmer als , busres, est. $6B assistance, childcare
Harlem campus wesfiored to services, involvement in
Rdeoteel development process,
xprovision that Columbia
employees would live
outside of district.
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Stakeholders Finances Community asksIProject IProject description
Project Benefits determined
Business development (contracts,
mentoring, space for small
businesses); $3M for local hiring
and job training (first source hiring);
environmental provisions; other
provisions (no Wal-Mart, pedestrian
scale design features, protections/
amenities for a buyer shopping
club, below market rent childcare,
meeting space for CB4)
F F
Outcomes as of 12/2010CBA signed?
I I
CBA signed
between Related
Co. and BOEDC in
2006; only 3 of 18
CBOs involved in
task force signed
agreement.
Project constructed and completed.
Some hiring of Bronx residents
achieved and funds for workforce
and apprenticeship training
provided; BOEDC accused of
misusing funds; job training and
hire programs underway.
2006 agreement providing $28 CBA signed among As of March 2010, it was unclear
million trust for the Bronx, free the Yankees, former if any of the funds promised were
tickets and sports equipment Borough President paid to local non-profits. No funds
for duration of the 40-year lease. Adolfo Carrion, and were dispersed until 2008, and it
Yankees contributed $10M to new
parks (est. total cost is $115M). te the Bronx Delegation is unclear whom funds were giventrs fudest toa bes adis .Ted of the City Council. to. In July 2010, local activists fromtrust fund is to be administered Local community the South Bronx Coalition publicly
by an appointee of an elected groups were asked about the funds, with no
officialio excluded. response from the Yankees.
CBAgsigedtamon
Project stalled; City Council blocked
over living wage. Borough presidentreent
managing separate initiative; KARA o ar n
stihl active.
Agreement negotiated addressing No CBA, but benefits
community asks, includingo n
affordable housing set-asides, nupwron gree
50,000 sq ft dedicated to local retail, upk otroug hees Due to market challenges, the
targeted workforce program, arts tasocimember, project has been stalled and broken
and cultural facility, technical Coou esbep, into five phases. Construction
assistance program for businesses Borouh Prident began in May 2010
in CB11 district, sustainable design, ispea unl 2
and public spaces; $10M investment Colrcto l ag is u
fund to assist local businesseslocallac
MOU was signed in which Columbia
agreed to provide $150M towardae
benefits, including $30M for a public CBA signed between AedsbuArild 2011 fudhe notwic
Projectestalled;sedtyyCouncilCblocked
school, $20M for affordable housin& the LDC and is resuming meetings to plan CBA
$20M for in-kind services, $4M for Columbia. implementation.
legal services, and $76M for TBD
uses
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IV. Major Findings
While these five case studies differ
in geography, key stakeholders, and
negotiating processes, we can begin to
draw preliminary conclusions across the
cases to help inform and understand the
web of public benefits negotiations in NYC.
Taking a step back, it is easy to understand
why there is such debate and confusion
about CBAs. Do they help community
groups advocate for their interests and gain
benefits? Do they push developers away
from cities? Are there important elements
across these NYC cases that can be drawn
out to imagine a better community benefits
negotiation process for all stakeholders
involved - communities, the city, and
developers? Are CBAs the best way for
municipalities to manage community
benefits? Moving forward, is there a better
process for benefits negotiations in NYC?
The cases shed light on these questions,
and highlight these major findings:
None of the processes or final agreements
described in this thesis follow the classic
CBA model in the sense that a coalition
of community organizations did not
drive negotiations with the developer,
with the exception of the Kingsbridge
Armory, although that project did not
come to fruition. The agreements at
Yankee Stadium and the Bronx Terminal
Market were negotiated with elected
officials. The City convened Columbia
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University's negotiations, and although
it included a community coalition that
determined many benefits in the resulting
CBA document, the process also included
heavy involvement from elected officials.
East 125* Street looks and feels closest to
many of the flagship CBAs in California
with respect to its process and document
outcome, but differs in that the community
groups negotiating were convened by the
City and Elected officials rather than from
their own organizing efforts. Another
main premise of CBAs - the ability of a
community coalition to hold developers
accountable and visa versa - is absent from
most of these agreements.
Through negotiations conducted
outside of the required land use process,
communities obtained more benefits
than they would have otherwise received.
Regardless of negotiation process, style,
or level of community involvement,
communities in every case received more
benefits than they would have without
entering into negotiations. The task
forces participating in the negotiations at
Columbia and East 125' St. may be deemed
most successful at obtaining the breadth
and depth of benefits those groups initially
wanted, but the communities at BTM and
Yankee Stadium also received promises
of benefits. According to organizers at
Kingsbridge Armory, halting the project as
it was planned is a benefit, as they can now
create a new plan to utilize that building.
The ad hoc nature of the CBA negotiations
and execution process generated
uncertainty for stakeholders. A more
systemized process helped assuage these
concerns. At BTM and Yankee Stadium,
community groups, a development
lawyer, and city representatives all note the
uncertainty around benefits negotiations
at those projects. There was inherent risk
for all parties, and confusion and dismay
from community groups when they were
cut out of negotiations. The processes at
Columbia and East 1251 St. gave comfort
to community groups and city officials
who knew what the process was and how
they would be involved.
Developers were willing to enter into
CBAs and willing to offer large sums of
money. This is true regardless of how
the process was managed, and indicates
that the developer is willing to work
with a variety of stakeholders (either the
city (East 125' St), community coalitions
(Columbia), or elected officials (BTM,
Yankee Stadium)). This finding contradicts
the beliefs of some city planning staff that
developers are unwilling to negotiate or
pay for benefits.
The absence of community representation
prevented some CBAs from meeting
community interests, while direct
representation of community groups
was central to ensuring the CBA process
was responsive to community interests
in other cases. The Yankee Stadium case
indicates that CBAs do not always include
community requests. While the BTM CBA
does include some benefits requested by
community groups, community members
involved with that process argue that it does
not meet all of their interests. Conversely,
aspects of Columbia University and East
125* Street show that CBAs do support
community interests. Indeed, the process
at East 125* Street seems to address
stakeholder concerns across the board,
where the community task force wrote the
RFP in partnership with the City, as well as
for the community coalition at Kingsbridge
Armory until the issue of living wage
came into conflict with the primary site
use. Community involvement prior to
developer selection or construction allows
for a more meaningful dialogue and
opportunity for debate and research before
the project development or permitting
process starts, and allows both the City
and community groups to get their ideas
and perspectives on the table. Community
involvement through a task force can also
establish a framework and partnership for
working together during future processes
related to the development.
The involvement of elected officials
complicates negotiations and raises
questions about representation, fiscal
accountability, and legitimacy. ULURP is
inherently political; approval of the Council
is essential to a project moving forward,
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and a Borough President's influence can
alter development decisions for years to
come. Elected officials' involvement and
power incents a developer to cater to the
desires and direction of those politicians.
While an argument can be made that
their constituents elected these officials,
community advocates argue that officials
do not always represent their needs.
Indeed, the cases highlighted demonstrate
the confusion and distrust that arises when
elected officials become involved with or
takeovernegotiations. WithYankee Stadium
and Bronx Terminal Market, suspicions
and concerns over fiscal accountability and
the creation of slush funds - or the funding
of an organization run by the friend of
an elected official - were rampant. In
the case of Columbia University, several
community organizations left the LDC
and ceased involvement in negotiations
after elected officials became involved,
raising questions of legitimacy and
representation, and community members
involved throughout note the confusion
of having so many stakeholders involved
who are connected to funds. With East
125* St., elected officials participated on
the negotiations task force, and ultimately
brokered the benefits agreement with the
developer. For this project, community
interests were largely represented by the
elected officials, though the task force felt
excluded from the final negotiations. At
Kingsbridge Armory, a strong community
coalition benefited from the support of
elected officials, though City officials
believe the elected officials disrupted the
land use planning process.
The community involvement process
- from initial project outreach through
negotiations - differed in each case. With
the Bronx Terminal Market and Yankee
Stadium, community groups were either
informally consulted or entirely excluded,
and negotiations proceeded between
the developer and elected officials.
Purposeful community exclusion left
community groups organizing separately
and unsuccessfully (Yankee Stadium) or
under the pretenses of inclusion (Bronx
Terminal Market). At Bronx Terminal
Market, community groups were involved
via elected officials, not through the City's
outreach process prior to ULURP. For
East 125' St, series of regular, organized
meetings gave strong structure to a complex
process of research and negotiations,
including both the community groups and
the city in conversations about benefits
before the developer was even part of
the process. At Columbia University, the
City and local Community Board selected
which community organizations would be
appointed to the local development board.
When given a chance to participate,
community groups developed their
benefits requests in roughly similar ways.
With the exception of Yankee Stadium,
which did not involve the community in
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its negotiations and CBA creation process,
the other four case study examples each
developed its list of benefits requests by
utilizing similar methodology. Namely, the
group involved self-selected and divided
themselves by claimed interest or expertise
around topical issues such as affordable
housing, public health, community space,
etc. At Kingsbridge Armory, through
years of process, KARA consulted with
a variety of topic experts in the field to
gain insight on their requested benefits.
Community negotiators at other projects
did not necessarily consult with experts
due to time and process constraints. At
East 1251 St., feasibility of implementation
and connection to the project (the nexus
argument) were guiding parameters to
determining benefit requests as well,
largely due to the presence of City officials
in the process. For Columbia University,
the WHLDC broke into smaller working
groups by issue and expertise. Data and a
systematic research method into necessary
benefits and their relation to the project
were not strong factors into most of the
case studies.
None of the final contracts contains strong
enforcement language or implementation
plans. Across all cases (except Kingsbridge)
that included variations of benefits
agreements, contract language around
benefits is largely unspecific with respect
to implementation of the components
necessary to ensure benefits delivery. In
each instance, the developer must make
"best faith efforts" to achieve "goals".
For example, with respect to workforce
development benefits and a First Source
Hiring referral system in the Bronx Terminal
Market contract, it states "the Developer
will commit to strongly encourage and
facilitate employers to use the First
Source Referral system by maximizing the
accessibility and ease of use of the system"
("Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal
Market Community Benefits Agreement,"
2006). While there are some more detailed
references to hiring goals and targets, the
contract provides significant loopholes
that allow developers - and for that
matter, community groups - wiggle room
to avoid actually meeting their obligations.
Without strong provisions for enforcement
or implementation, community groups
and other stakeholders do not have a
means to ensure that negotiated benefits
will actually be delivered.
While the amount of public subsidy in
each case varied, public perception of the
developer's ability to give back benefits
to the community was constant. Project
costs, and the amount of public subsidies
provided, differed in each case. While
there appears to be no direct link between
the amount of subsidies provided and the
dollar amount of benefits provided, there
is a perception that developers receiving
large amounts of public funding should be
able to pay for benefits.
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Benefits negotiations took a significant
amount of time for all parties involved.
From a process and project management
perspective, the benefits negotiations
processes across all cases (except Yankees
Stadium, for which there is no information
available on this subject) took an exorbitant
amount of time. KARA organized and
did research for years in preparation for
negotiations, while City Hall and the EDC
worked concurrently for years conducting
site studies, releasing RFPs, and managing
the developer selection process. Both
the City and KARA invested substantive
time into meeting with Related. In the
processes at East 12 5th St., Columbia
University, and BTM, those directly
involved with the negotiations report
meeting for 4-10 hours on a regular basis,
often weekly or every other week, for 1-3
years. These time estimates do not include
preparatory research, follow up with
constituents and supervisors, individual
group planning meetings, or travel time.
A back of the envelope calculation for
Columbia University Expansion shows
that a conservative estimate for Jesse
Masyr, the land use lawyer representing
the LDC, spent over 900 hours on meetings
and negotiations for the project. Time for
community groups and city representatives
is likely higher.
Mayoral policies shape the structure of
all public agreements. The Bloomberg
administration -which initially supported
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CBAs - changed course and no longer
supports benefits negotiations that are
conducted or managed outside of the
City's process. Columbia University's
negotiation and agreement process was
funded and supported by City Hall, in part
because Columbia is such an important
institution and stakeholder in NYC, but
also because City Hall policy advisors
supported CBAs generally at that time.
Conversely, East 125f Street reflected an
administration that wanted to avoid CBAs
at all costs, and instead enshrine benefits
discussions and commitments within the
City's process. At Kingsbridge Armory,
the Mayor remained opposed to CBAs, and
related benefits issues ultimately killed
the project at a City Council vote. Mayor
Bloomberg's reputation as a bottom-line
driven business mogul who is friends
with developers over community groups
supports his actions that seek to spur
private investment in NYC while avoiding
CBAs.
An administration with a different
perspective, for example, one thatmaintains
a different relationship with community
groups and toward developers, or that
is inclined toward inclusive negotiations
processes, could completely alter the
outcomes of these projects.
Findings Summary
The cases documented here demonstrate
that while CBA negotiations were to some
extent successful in obtaining benefits
for communities, the problems and risk
associated with an ad hoc, unregulated
process far outweigh the benefits. In
essence, the cases have defined good policy
in a negative way: while CBAs are good in
theory, they are not an effective mechanism
for benefits negotiation and delivery
without well-defined process parameters
that address the role of stakeholders,
and a structured, formal implementation
mechanism. The cases reveal that in order
for a CBA negotiation to be successful, it
must include the following factors: legal
basis, consistent application, provision
for legitimate community representation,
a structured implementation, fiscal
accountability, and open dialogue among
stakeholders.
The NYC cases articulate why each of
these factors is critical to achieving the goal
of redistributing benefits to those most
negatively impacted by development:
Because they have no legal basis, CBAs
lack rules and regulations specifying who
should be involved or how implementation
will occur. The lack of legal structure hurt
efforts in two cases in NYC, as developers
and elected officials brokered deals that
excluded community representatives;
there was nothing to prevent this from
happening.
Additionally, ad hoc processes lead to
inconsistent applications of CBAs in
NYC, such that in each case, the roles
of stakeholders, the amount of money
developers provided, and implementation
mechanisms differed. The lack of clear
process creates confusion on all sides
about what can be expected during
negotiations, especially for community
groups working on separate projects that
are in communication with each other as
they seek 'best practices.' The rules of the
game change from project to project and
negotiation to negotiation.
The cases believed to have the best benefits
outcomes had the strongest mechanism
of community representation and
involvement. Provisions for community
representation in a consistent, legitimate
fashion are essential to project legitimacy,
connection of benefits to community need,
and fair negotiations. The NYC cases
lacking community representation are the
least respected by stakeholders, and are
more likely to involve legal grievances.
Without clear accounting mechanisms and
rules around which community groups
or organizations receive benefits funding,
fiscal accountability became a significant
problem. Creating and managing a system
to collect and deliver funds is an essential
factor in benefits negotiations, as without
it, political deals and ineffectual funds
disbursement can strangle benefits delivery
or lead to lawsuits as was demonstrated in
several cases in NYC.
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An open dialogue and platform for
communication is a critical factor in CBAs,
particularly the more successful NYC
cases. The forum for ongoing conversation
provides an opportunity for all stakeholders
to present of ideas, challenges, and
opportunities.
While the case studies highlight five
projects in NYC, the major findings
highlight essential factors for public
benefits negotiations in any U.S. city.
The challenges and opportunities are not
unique to NYC, and contain implications
for all stakeholders seeking to address and
improve public benefits negotiations. In
order for these case studies to be most useful
in considering the effectiveness of CBAs
and in improving benefits negotiations,
we must consider how to take the lessons
learned from NYC and incorporate them
into a better model that has national
application.
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V. Conclusion
CBAs and negotiated public benefits are the
latest attempt to go beyond traditional land
use regulations and address the broader
public interest, in both NYC and elsewhere
in the country. The NYC cases illustrate
that CBAs do not always accomplish
their intended goals. In fact, my analysis
of the five case studies demonstrates that
public benefits negotiations often go off
track. They get caught up in accusations
of illegitimacy, failure to ensure fair
representation, misuse of public funds,
and questionable political wheeling and
dealing. It is also clear, however, that CBAs
can provide a platform for substantive
discussions about public benefits, which
can benefit all three types of stakeholders:
community groups, who otherwise may
be excluded; developers, who question
why they are required to pay money above
and beyond the taxes that everyone else
is expected to pay, and cities, which walk
a fine line between these two groups. I
believe that the successes, challenges, and
opportunities highlighted by the NYC cases
provide a basis for rethinking ways that
CBAs can be more useful to municipalities
throughout the United States.
My most important finding is that public
benefits negotiations should move beyond
ad hoc exchanges to a more organized,
mandated process. Ad hoc processes are
inherently risky and unfair for all parties.
Developers are uncertain about the
amount of time involved and the amount
of money they will be expected to pay, and
are concerned about public perception.
For community groups, CBAs generate
opportunities for involvement in decisions
that affect them, but often, exclude them
when others co-opt the process. They can
lead toahostofchallengesformunicipalities
trying to balance private investment
with serving their poorest residents and
protecting municipal assets. However,
without an alternative process to address
public benefits around development
projects, community groups will continue
to fight for CBAs, developers will continue
to fund them, and municipalities will
continue to be caught in the middle, often
missing opportunities to steer the process
toward better outcomes.
A New Model
Critical Elements
A new, regulated process specifically
addressing public benefits is necessary for
NYC and many other municipalities as
long as private investment into large-scale
projects continues. This section details the
critical elements of a new process, while
the following final section presents ideas
for managing and implementing the new
process in conjunction with existing land
use approvals processes. A new process for
benefits negotiations should include six key
components: first, community inclusion
in the RFP or project visioning process;
Conclusions: A New Model 67
second, establishment of formal exactions;
third, community representation; fourth,
community impact analysis; fifth, fiscal
accountability; and sixth, structured
implementation mechanisms. Taken
together, these components address the
bulk of concerns raised by all stakeholders
and provide the best route for successful
benefits negotiations.
Community inclusion
The first component of a new publicbenefits
negotiation process involves community
inclusion in the city-led project visioning
and RFP creation process. The municipal
entity leading planning and development
efforts should convene a working group
of community, city, and elected official
stakeholders interested in participating in a
visioning process around a particular large-
scale development project. A working
group comprised of stakeholders gives the
city an opportunity to include local elected
officials as well as a range of community
groups. From the start, a collaborative
format creates a partnership between the
city and the community, which may reduce
community opposition toward the city and
also allows space for dialogue. In their
analysis of communication challenges in
multi-stakeholder negotiations, Fisher and
Ury note that the three biggest problems
are that opposing sides may not be talking
to each other, that sides may not hear each
other, and that misunderstandings occur.
They prescribe preventative actions such
as building working relationships and
facing problems together (Fisher & Ury,
1991), which supports the notion of upfront
community inclusion and a collaborative
working group. Proactive inclusion
could promote better communication and
decision making in the benefits negotiation
process.
A working group format allows the city
to present its vision for development and
solicit meaningful feedback. In many
municipalities, city-led presentations
already exist in the standard land use
planning process, though they typically
take the form of a large public presentation
and subsequent feedback from attendees
in the form of two-minute speeches. By
comparison, working groups create forums
for dialogue and follow up. The working
group convened by the city can complement
the existing public process and work
together to address areas of concern or
opportunity, and could range from design
and site use to a variety of community
benefits and their implementation. While
the idea of a collaborative process between
city staff and community groups may
initially cause individuals on both sides
to hesitate, each of these stakeholders is
already spending more and more time
trying to communicate with the other
(McKnight, 2010). Furthermore, CBAs
involve countless hours of negotiation,
research and follow up that can detain
the development process. Working
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collaboratively to address issues of joint
concern proactively creates opportunities
to address questions before they become
public controversies. Experts in multi-
stakeholder processes who specialize in
complex negotiations note the chance to
avoid lawsuits later on in the development
process that can cause extensive and
costly development delays if collaborative
dialogue is held, an aspect that should
interest all stakeholders involved.
The benefits of community inclusion
extend to developers as well. Project RFPs
written in partnership with the community
will include community concerns and
expectations. This prominent inclusion
sets a clear expectation that the community
will be involved in the process, and
demonstrates that the benefits proposed
have been endorsed by the city. When
bidding on the project, developers know
that they are expected to address public
benefits in their proposals, and can trust
that fundamental elements of the project,
such as design and site use, have already
be reviewed and vetted by the community
and city alike. With this knowledge of
community expectations, developers
are assured that there will be fewer
clashes with community groups along
the way, including lawsuits in backlash
to development proposals. Additionally,
knowing what benefits cities expect to be
included in the project can help developers
determine project costs; this should
also assuage city staff concerns about
scaring away developers during benefits
negotiations.
Formal Exactions
In hot markets around the country,
developers are willing to put large sums of
money toward CBAs to allay community
concerns and smooth the pathto a successful
development. In many cities where CBAs
are enacted, there are no formulas or
standards as to the amount developers are
required to pay. Nor are there regulations
to ensure fiscal accountability and good
implementation once a developer releases
funds.
Existing CBAs are a red flag alerting the
municipality that they must create new
policies to manage benefits funding.
New policies should evolve through the
development and implementation of a
formal exaction that applies to certain
development projects. This exaction could
be based on a variety of factors, including
the projects costs and profit, size of the
project, amount of subsidies received,
project community impact, and other
relevant factors. Such calculations will
help make certain that a city is competitive
in terms of its real estate market and value
of development and exacting funds within
a reasonable limit.
Exacted community benefits funds could
be placed into an escrow account or
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community benefits fund associated with
the related project. In order to guarantee
that the funds are disbursed and matched
to community needs discovered by the
Community Impact Analysis (described
laterinthis chapter), the Cityshould manage
the fund and work with the working group
that created the RFP to determine fund
allocation. The fund manager should be
a city staff member rather than an elected
official or community representative. This
separation will help avoid mishaps and
questions of illegitimacy raised when a
community organization or elected official
receives funds that they helped negotiate.
Fund allocation could involve contracts for
services or targeted city service provisions.
Setting an exaction around community
benefits gives all stakeholders alike a
new level of control. Municipalities and
community groups can regulate the funds
disbursed by developers through CBAs,
and ensure that proper accountability
measures and proper reporting are
employed. Developers gain certainty over
funding expectations, and can make more
accurate projections of total development
costs. Additionally, since exacted fees will
go into an escrow account or benefits fund
associated with the related project, the
developer does not have to be involved
with determining the fiscal allocations
to individual benefits needs. Developers
would welcome this increased efficiency
and straightforward conclusion to a
development project.
Representation
For every municipal-led large-scale
development project, representatives
from the community should participate
via the processes discussed under
community inclusion - but the question
of how representation takes place must be
specifically addressed. Representatives
should come from many different types
of community groups who have a
demonstrated history and connection to
the community. If the city is convening
a working group, it should be their
responsibility to conduct outreach to
community groups. Local elected officials
may be able to assist. Another valid option
is hiring a third party neutral facilitator to
conduct an assessment of the community
and help determine who should be at the
table. A neutral facilitator, someone not
affiliated with any of the stakeholders and
not impacted by negotiation outcomes, can
provide legitimacy to determining who
should be involved. Having adequate
representation will assure all stakeholders
that public engagement will be meaningful
and more accurate than an ad hoc process.
Impartially selected representatives should
help prevent outcry or lawsuits later on
in the process. Broad representation also
creates a means of capturing the indigenous
knowledge that exists in communities,
which can be exploited to the benefit of all
stakeholders.
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Municipalities can also work to develop
baseline criteria to determine community
representation. City staff in NYC raised
concerns about whether citywide or
national advocacy groups should be at the
table along with local groups, a concern
that might exist in any municipality. The
role of local vs. broader community groups
will likely change from project to project
depending on what local needs and assets
exist. City agencies that regularly partner
with organizations in neighborhoods
across cities can assist with this challenge.
While there may always be questions
about which groups should be included,
developing this type of framework gives
stakeholders a better place to start, and
avoids handpicked representatives at the
negotiating table. Baseline criteria could
include proximity to the development
site or area of impact, involvement in the
community, or expertise and involvement
with the issues and benefits discussion at
hand.
Community Impact Analysis
Similar to an environmental impact
statement (EIS), a community impact
analysis should be developed to both
quantitatively and qualitatively determine a
development's impacts on a neighborhood
or community. A Community Impact
Analysis would involve researching all
aspects of community impact, both positive
and negative, including those points
typically raised by community groups such
as impact on affordable housing, public
health, and workforce development. The
process would be managed by the city
and completed in partnership with the
aforementioned working group.
Creating a system for conducting this
analysis addresses several concerns from
different stakeholders. A Community
Impact Analysis provides community
groups assurance that their concerns will
be reviewed in a thorough process with
adequate resources, as opposed to research
conducted by community volunteers that
may not have the background expertise
or resources to do so. If community
groups have issue expertise, this process
ensures that their knowledge can be put
to good use. Standardized analysis allows
developers an opportunity to critically
examine and understand the total impact
their project presents, and provides a
framework through which to examine
community concerns and determines their
relevancy to a project. This type of broader
impact analysis further gives the city a role
in benefits determination and negotiations,
and allows the city the means to manage
exorbitant demands a community group
might make of a developer. Detailed
analysis also allows examination into the
positive impacts of a project that may be
overlooked in a process that exclusively
focuses on negative benefits.
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Furthermore, a centralized analysis process
will help manage the benefits funds and
potential overlap of benefits when several
projects are being constructed in the same or
nearby neighborhoods. The data collected
in the Community Impact Analysis will
generate the source of community "needs"
that could be addressed by funds provided
through the exaction. For example, the
data might show that the community
impacted by new development suffers
from unemployment and would benefit
from education, training, and connection
to jobs created by new development, or that
public health concerns such as obesity are
paramount in an impacted neighborhood
and that open space promoting healthy
lifestyles could be a benefit connected to
new development. The analysis can also
help determine what should be funded
in the instance that two nearby projects
exact fees for benefits. For example, if
workforce development benefits or space
for community groups are already being
provided by one project, funds from a
second, nearby project may be spent on
another community need.
Fiscal accountability
A transparent method for receiving
and disbursing benefits funds should
be established as part of a new process.
As described earlier in the section on
establishing formal exactions, funds
should be put into an escrow account or
pre-established community benefits fund
that is overseen by a city staff member.
The working group, in partnership with
the city, should allocate funds to address
the key areas of need and opportunity
as identified by the community impact
analysis. For instance, if the analysis
indicates that a development will result
in increased housing prices and this is the
highest priority of the task force, funds
should be allocated to support affordable
housing development rather than other
uses.
Community representatives participating
in the working group should not
automatically receive funds for their
organizations, and similarly, elected
officials should not be allowed to direct
funds. Rather, there should be a contracting
process by which funds are allocated to
the organizations and groups best able to
provide necessary services. This process
should be managed by the fund administer
with the working group. Efficient and
effective distribution of benefits should be
the primary goal of the fund administrator.
Implementation
An institutionalized process with a
working group, sound representation, and
provisions for fiscal accountability is only
as good as the process' implementation
mechanism. This premise is closely tied
to fiscal accountability and community
impact analysis, but goes beyond research
and funding management to detail
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exactly how benefits will be delivered.
For example, analysis may show high
unemployment rates in the neighborhood
where a new, job-generating project will be
built. The working group may decide to
allocate funds for workforce development
programming. Yet, recognizing who
will be providing those programs and
services and determining the feasibility of
implementation is a critical component of
a new process. If local service providers
do not exist to deliver necessary benefits,
then deciding a benefit dependent on
that service is useless without creating an
implementation plan. The implementation
plan should be the road map to ensure that
agreed upon benefits will be delivered. An
implementation plan can address existing
gaps in service delivery that impact
benefits, and can help direct benefits funds
to the places that will have the most impact.
For example, funds may be allocated
toward a city-run program or bringing in
an outside service provider. The working
group should develop a long-term project
plan that addresses service delivery with
respect to the benefits deemed most
necessary. A plan should detail measures
of success, milestones, monitoring, and
oversight.
Taken together, these six components of a
new process address many concerns about
benefits negotiation raised by stakeholders
on all sides. However, the new process will
only succeed with a clear management plan
that delineates a timeframe for action and
roles and responsibilities. This final section
illustrates how a new process should be
managed in conjunction with current land
use development and approval processes,
and articulates how the six critical elements
outlined previously will be included for
success.
Conclusions: A New Model 73
Current Process
Formal Actions Adhoc Outreach CBAs Timeline
City evalutes city-
o owned land
City conducts
- research and
W o analysis; develops
U V) project vision
(U
RFP development
and release
Developers submit
( proposals; city
o.~ reviews
e o Developer selection;
0 certify into ULURP
Developer submits
application to DCP
Community Board
hearing and advisory
recommendation
Review by elected
D officials and advisory
recommendation
CPC hearing and
review
City Council review
and vote
.- City manages
project certification;
continues to meet
cn with developer
No during construction(A)
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New Model
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Process Management
In many municipalities, the existing land
use approvals process for disposition of
city-owned land involves the steps and
timeframes articulated in the diagram on
page 74 labeled 'Current Process.' While
this diagram is based on the timeframes
and steps in NYC's approvals process
and reflects a strong Mayor system, it can
be altered to illustrate the process in any
city. As shown in the 'Current Process,'
a city's land use process may have
several rounds of reviews by different
stakeholder groups (elected officials, a
formal community council or board, the
City Council), which likely includes a
handful of public meetings. Municipal
planning staff complete varying levels
of ad hoc outreach to community groups
outside of required interactions, and also
host meetings with groups or individuals
as requested. The last column generally
describes the CBA process in relation to
an existing land use approvals process.
The column demonstrates the ambiguity
of the CBA process, the uncertainty over
when and how community groups interact
with developers or the city, and the lack of
control or clarity over the process.
A new process, involving the elements
described in full in the previous section of
this chapter, could be managed to include
early involvement of community groups in
a manner that supports existing approval
processes. As described in the diagram on
page 75 labeled'New Model,' an improved
process could be designed and managed
to address the needs and interests of
communities impacted by development
while simultaneously attending to a city's
goals and ultimate plans for development
and investment. Additionally, the 'New
Model' includes time and methods
for including the six critical elements
(representation, formal exactions, etc.)
that will speak to and solve many of the
problems associated with CBAs and other
ad hoc benefits negotiations to date.
The 'New Model' hinges upon strong
collaboration between a municipality
and the working group of stakeholders
through the entire development process.
Collaboration begins during project
formation and scoping, when certain
factors will trigger the decision to form
a working group. Specifications of
which factors require a working group
could include the size of a building,
cost, subsidies provided, likely impact,
anticipated and/or community backlash.
For example, if the project is XY square
footage or is projected to require YZ in
subsidies, the collaborative process will be
mandated. The triggering factors will vary
city to city; the size of a project in Albany
that dwarfs the landscape may be of little
notice in New York City, and formulas
for subsidies and other incentives change
across city and state lines. Regardless, if
warranted, the working group should be
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formed during the project formation stage
to encourage maximum dialogue from the
very beginning, thus creating an inclusive
and proactive process. As described in
the 'New Model' diagram, collaboration
continues throughout the approvals
process and after the development project
is approved.
Challenges to the New Model
While a new model involving formalized
exactions and working groups may
ultimately create a better model for benefits
negotiations, it is not without challenges
and critiques.
Weak market cities. It is reasonable to think
that exactions for community benefits may
not work in weak market cities where the
market is not as favorable and there is little
leeway to ask developers to pay additional
money. In these cases, it may be difficult
to negotiate ad hoc CBAs as well. In weak
market cities, it is still worthwhile for cities
to partner with community groups to
develop a shared vision for development
and its associated benefits, as this can
help cities maximize private investment to
benefit all residents. For example, a weak
market city may not have fiscal leverage,
but can offer developers marketing
assistance and community support for
projects.
Lack of civic involvement.
neighborhoods that lack
There are
strong civic
involvement and active community
groups, meaning that there are few if any
community representatives to participate
in a working group. While lack of
community representatives to collaborate
with means that the working group model
will not function as strongly to start, there
are other methods of gauging input and
interest from a community to hear their
voice in a proactive way. Deliberative
polling, a method by which the city or a
hired consultant calls a representative
cross section of a neighborhood based
on demographics, can collect important
information about community vision and
perspective, though it limits dialogue and
community members may not know all of
the public benefits or other development
elements that are on the table for
negotiation. Developing neighborhood
councils or other forms of informal
neighborhood groups that could eventually
generate involvement in a collaborative
working group is another option. Lastly,
in conjunction with polling, the city
could work with a community's elected
officials. While the case studies in this
thesis showed that elected officials did not
always negotiate with their constituents'
interests at the forefront, communities still
received more benefits than when nobody
was involved.
Cost of exaction. Despite the fact that
developers have been willing to pay for ad
hoc community benefits funds in the past in
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NYC and elsewhere in the country, formal
exactions bring direct and indirect costs to
a municipality (program management and
operation) and direct costs to developers
(the exaction itself). While the New Model
articulates how these time and dollar costs
will ultimately be less than payments
made into an unregulated benefits system,
stakeholders may still harbor concerns
about paying formal exactions due to costs.
Interests of the City (convener vs. member of
working group). City government maintains
a number of interests in development
projects - to bring private investment to
cities, to manage growth, to follow legal
processes and regulations, and to provide
services and goods to its residents. Some
community groups raise concerns over
the role of the City in the 'New Model;' if
it is the City's ultimate interests to ensure
that development moves forward, how
can we be sure that the working group
will be empowered to actively influence
and be involved with negotiations or
decision making processes? A possible
solution is to hire a neutral facilitator not
only to assess which community groups or
stakeholders should be part of the working
group, but also to manage the working
group meetings and process. Separating
process management into a new role could
also allow the City to be an active player
in the negotiations if desired, rather than
attempting to play a more neutral role.
Another possible solution is to give the
working a vote in the ULURP process,
although many of the prospective working
group stakeholders conduct advisory votes
and recommendations.
Interests of elected officials. Although elected
officials will be members of the working
group, and therefore be actively involved
in negotiations, there is a chance that at the
11* hour, an elected official (particularly
a City Councilor) may act in his/her own
accord. At the point of the City Council
vote in NYC (or the final deciding vote in
another municipality), a City Councilor
could make a last minute change or
concession to the negotiated plan. Ideally,
the new process would prevent this from
happening, as the elected official should be
able to openly advocate and negotiate on
behalf of his/her constituents throughout
the entire process and would have little
need for a last minute change.
Conclusion
There are sometimes critiques like those
described here of institutionalized
processes that require partnerships
across municipalities, developers, and
communities to systemically address
benefits as part of a holistic development
process. Some neighborhoods do
not have active community groups;
some municipalities lack the political
will of leadership to enter into formal
conversations about benefits outside the
land use process. Community groups
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may believe that a more institutionalized
process forces them to give up community
power and the ability to organize, and
may feel that they can no longer fight for
benefits on their own. Developers, on
the other hand, may prefer to simply cut
a check to whoever is making demands
in the loudest voice, and avoid a year of
meetings around benefits. Cities, whether
large or small, may experience anxiety
about ceding control to a task force or
blended stakeholder group in order to
make decisions. The list of potential
criticisms is extensive.
Despitethesepotentialoppositions,itisclear
that negative project impacts will continue
to generate attention for the foreseeable
future. Without a strong alternative to
CBAs, the problems I have highlighted
will persist, and all parties involved will
continue to miss opportunities to gain
more benefits. City governments will
continue to use incentives to draw private
investment and development into their
cities. The stated goal of most public service
agencies is to improve the livelihood of
constituents and communities. Therefore,
it would be irresponsible for cities to make
economic development decisions enticing
private development at the expense of
communities when a system could be
employed to address these concerns. The
current recession in the real estate market
gives stakeholders with vested interests
a chance to step back and consider the
possibility of an improved benefits
negotiations process that can be used as
the market rebounds and development
projects resume. This new model provides
a way to address development projects in a
broader, deeper and more comprehensive
manner.
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Appendix A
List of interviews:
Vicki Been, NYU Law
Deborah Carney, NYC Department of City Planning
John Choe, NYC Comptroller's Office
Miquela Craytor, Sustainable South Bronx (formerly of BOEDC)
Alyssa Katz, Pratt Center for Community Development
Gavin Kearny, New York Public Lawyers
Jesse Masyr, Wachtel & Masyr LLP
Tom McKnight, NYCEDC
Timothy Mitchell, Antioch Baptist Church
Daniel Mule, Columbia University Law Student (formerly NYCEDC)
Jessica Pavone, NYCEDC
Desiree Pilgrim-Hunter, NWBCCC
Jennifer Sun, NYCEDC
Matthew Wambua, HPD (formerly of the Mayor's Office)
Matthew White, NYC Department of Small Business Services
Joshua Winter, NYCEDC
Community Representative (confidential)
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